THE CARTER CENTER

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These figures represent a decline from 1994-95, when 33 major armed conflicts were waged in 27 locations, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Conflict locations are designated by the internationally recognized borders of a state. In some cases, countries are involved in more than one conflict, which accounts for the larger number of conflicts than conflict locations.

Discussion of world conflicts depends on the manner in which "conflict" is defined. As in the first two editions of the *State of World Conflict Report*, we employ here the definition for a "major armed conflict" used by Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen of SIPRI as follows:

Major Armed Conflict: prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, and incurring the battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 people during the entire conflict.[1]

All major armed conflicts for 1995 were armed civil or intrastate conflicts, as opposed to those between states. SIPRI notes, however, that "in 1995 there were brief armed conflicts between states, e.g., that between Ecuador and Peru, which did not fulfill the criteria for major armed conflicts."[2] Other conflicts do not appear because they also fail to meet the above definition. These include armed combat that did not involve government forces, as well as lower-level combat, which would be considered "minor" armed conflict. Efforts were made to detail some of these cases in the narrative summaries for each conflict location or in the feature articles that appear throughout this publication. Many of the summaries and articles were contributed by experts in the field, and the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect positions held by The Carter Center, its staff, or members of its International Negotiation Network.

For statistical data, efforts were made to supply the most current information available. Those instances where no figures were available are indicated with "na." In all cases, statistical information is provided for the government of the country listed rather than for opposition or rebel groups, unless otherwise specified. Consequently, figures listed in some statistical categories, such as "Total Deaths," are frequently lower than the true total. At times, these numbers vary greatly, such as in Sudan, where we employ SIPRI's total of 37,000 to 40,000 for the entire length of the conflict, while some press reports indicate that more than 1.5 million people have died since 1983.

In the category labeled "The Conflict," the term "Incompatibility" refers to the notion that the conflicts are contests for control of either government (type of political system, a change of central government, or a change in its composition) or territory (control of territory, secession, or autonomy).[3]

Data on arms flows provided by the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database represent "trend-indicator values" for major conventional weapons imports and should be used as an indicator of the volume in numbers and capacity of weapons transfers rather than as real flows of money. Thus, these figures should be used to measure a trend over years or between countries rather than for comparisons of official statistics on imports or exports.[4]

The United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) measures the distance a country has to go to attain the UNDP's *1995 Human Development Report* goals in life expectancy, educational attainment, and income indicators on a 1.000 scale. The nearer a country's HDI total is to 1.000, the closer it is to attaining these goals.

The *State of World Conflict Report* strives to be neutral and unbiased in its reporting. In choosing how to list each conflict, we employ the name recognized by the United Nations. It must be noted, however, that while Myanmar is the official name for the state of Burma, we have chosen to list both names in recognition of the dispute between the majority of the population and the ruling military council on the status of that country's name. Also, we list "Russia(Chechnya)" to denote that the major armed conflict in the country of Russia has been waged in the republic of Chechnya, and data pertaining to this conflict relates specifically to the region rather than the country as a whole. Finally, for the purpose of

This year, the world celebrated the 100th anniversary of the modern Olympiad. Consider this vision of a world at peace: The opening ceremonies in Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Stadium, where more than 10,000 athletes from 197 countries gathered to demonstrate the highest ideals—teamwork, sportsmanship, and recognition of personal achievement. All invited countries participated, free of the ideological and political restraints that prevented many from attending in years past. For 16 days in July and August the world came together to honor those striving to surmount universal standards of excellence. Our hearts reached out to the hurdler who stumbled just before the finish line, the marathon runner who shook off fatigue, the Paralympian who rose above all expectations. We saw, for a brief moment, the potential all of us have to better ourselves and our world.

In ancient Greece, nations at war set a time during which all conflicts were temporarily halted so athletes and spectators could travel to and from the Games. Centuries later, hope endures that the brief peace achieved in the spirit of competition will extend beyond the walls of the stadium to embrace all peoples in all nations. Count Henri de Baillet Latour, one of the pioneers of the modern Olympic movement, recognized the connection between the Olympic ideal and the quest for a truly peaceful world community. He spoke the following words to the Organizing Committee of the Games of the XIth Olympiad:

> "May the young athletes of the whole world come, through the Olympiad, to know and recognize its greatness and practical value, and may endeavors germinate to make an end of hate, to eliminate misunderstanding, and to contribute in association with all men of good will to the restoration of harmony among the peoples."

The restoration of harmony described by Count Latour has been the focus of Olympic Aid, a United Nations-led effort to provide health care and educational tools to children in war-torn countries. Far away from the flag-waving and television cameras, many of those athletes who visited Atlanta returned to countries ravaged by war. Millions of war-affected and displaced people are engaged, not in athletic competitions, but in a desperate struggle to survive the

between 30,000 and 60,000 military personnel and civilians were killed. Another 15 million people now live as refugees, forced to flee their homes as a result of armed conflicts. The human costs

United Nations at the Crossroads

by Brian Urquhart

Sir Brian Urquhart has been a scholar-in-residence in the International Affairs Program at The Ford Foundation since 1986. Prior to this he served in the United Nations Secretariat as under-secretary general for special political affairs and was one of the principal political advisors to the secretary-general.

The 50th anniversary of the United Nations in 1995 was not only a disillusioning but an alarming affair. Behind routine celebratory speeches by heads of state there was little substance and even less enthusiasm. The basic questions about international organization that need to be answered if the world organization is to be reformed virtually were ignored. Very little real interest was manifested in redefining, renewing, and empowering the United Nations. Instead, the talk was about cutting back and reducing.

Fifty years without a world war seems to have bred, in some influential quarters at least, a contagious anti-internationalism with strong ostrich-like and flat-earth overtones. This fashion finds a perfect target in the United Nations. In five years we have gone from President Bush's New World Order of "dynamic multilateralism" and the U.N. "renaissance" to an extraordinary loss of confidence in, and respect for, the United Nations.

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In those five years its member states have loaded the organization down with the debris of the Cold War, and much else besides, without providing the resources, the authority, or the staying power to deal properly with such immense and complex problems. The use of the United Nations as a fig leaf and a scapegoat has led to a fashion for turning away from it as a peacekeeper in favor of as-yet-undesignated "coalitions of the willing," rather than building, in the world organization, the new changes and the infrastructure needed to tackle contemporary outbursts of violence.

Five years ago the trend was strikingly different. Because virtually no one had anticipated the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union, very little thought had been given to the realities of a post-Cold War world. The initial euphoria spawned a number of unrealistic beliefs, including the conviction that the United Nations would begin to function as originally intended. A number of events supported this belief. The organization presided over the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the independence of Namibia. It took over, with considerable success, the pacification of Cambodia, El Salvador, and other Cold War proxy-battle sites such as Mozambique. The U.N. Security Council mobilized the world against Iraq's seizure of Kuwait and authorized the U.S.-led Desert Storm. Apartheid in South Africa, long a target of the United Nations, miraculously came to an end, and majority rule emerged under a U.N.-monitored election.

U.N.'s Expanding Responsibilities

These and other successes led to an extraordinary expansion of U.N. responsibilities and operations—operations that were increasingly over-mandated and under-resourced. During this enthusiastic interlude, governments were slow to realize that the primary task of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security had changed fundamentally in nature and direction. Dealing with international

conflicts had given way almost completely to trying to control intrastate conflicts and humanitarian disasters.

Before the implications of these changes had become clear, the United Nations was committed in Bosnia, Somalia,

This Ken an soldier is one of thousands provided b U.N.-member nations to peacekeeping operations around the world. The scope and objectives of these operations have often come under fire. (hotograph b the United Nations)

Rwanda, Haiti, and several other places in situations with which it could not possibly deal effectively, either with its well-tried peacekeeping techniques, or within the limitations imposed by its member states in matters both of jurisdiction and financing. Although the media and the public seem to expect the United Nations to act as the public sector of a supportive world community, it is, in fact, still very much a restricted intergovernmental institution with minimal authority, resources, or infrastructure.

The result has been a disillusionment and a downgrading of the United Nations as exaggerated and foolish as the euphoria of the post-Cold War period. Although only four of the 17 operations launched since 1990 have had serious setbacks, the organization's stock has never been lower, and it is now frequently ignored altogether in vital matters of peace and security.

The main emphasis at U.N. headquarters is on downsizing and cost-cutting, masquerading as "reform," and dealing with a "financial crisis" which is, in fact, an ideological and political crisis, especially as far as the United States is concerned.

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In many parts of the world, there is now a strong antipathy to, and distrust of, governments, multilateralism, and international institutions. The United Nations is a prime target for such thinking, especially in Washington. There is no doubt that the United Nations, in its 52nd year, needs radical restructuring, streamlining, and reorienting. It needs to be realigned with the realities of half a century of technological, political, and social revolution. Its member states, however, show little sign of undertaking this effort, preferring the easier course of denouncing the organization's administration and its alleged wastefulness and bureaucratic speed.

Fundamental Questions

The questions to be faced are relatively simple, but fundamental. Is the United Nations supposed to be an international system for maintaining peace, security, human rights, and human welfare? Or is it simply a dumping ground for problems that governments either cannot, or will not, take on themselves? Is the United Nations predominantly a moral and legal organization, the guardian and executor of its charter principles, and of the norms, conventions, and treaties it has sponsored? Or is it primarily a political organization—a screen, safety net, and fig leaf—through which its members can save face and disentangle themselves from impossible situations, often without much regard for principle or treaty obligation? Is it to be guided by law or by the caprices of its major powers? Is it a purely intergovernmental organization, or should civil society and the private sector play an increasing role in its proceedings?

These are only a few of the questions that should provide the magnetic pull for a process of genuine reform. Unfortunately, in the present parochial and neo-isolationist climate, governments seem to have little or no inclination to discuss them. Thus, the endlessly invoked need for reform is an arid, limited process dictated more by political and ideological forces than by the desire to make a vital investment in the future. The concept of the world organization was Franklin Roosevelt's great legacy. It is going through cold and stormy times in a period where governments apparently feel less threatened by world disaster than at any time since 1945.

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An isolationist mood prevails in addition to a singular lack of sense either of history or of the possibilities, both good and bad,

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However, the extended involvement of the nongovernmental sector should not undermine the importance of the moral authority of the United Nations as a global organization and its wide technical capacity and expertise. The problems the world faces today require solutions that the United Nations cannot meet alone. The United Nations can often provide the strategic framework for preventive diplomacy. At the very least, a better form of partnership is needed at every level between U.N. bodies, governments, NGOs, and regional citizen-based organizations. Drug trafficking and international terrorism demonstrate the willingness of governments in every part of the world to collaborate with each other in preventive action. The need is for this cohesion to move onto additional areas of concern.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

Multi-track diplomacy,[4] defined as the application of peacemaking from different vantage points within a multicentered network, reflects the different levels and variety of factors which need to be addressed. The involvement of multiple actors at every level of a conflict is intended first to bring greater accountability and adherence to human rights and humanitarian law by all sides, and second to ensure that all those affected by and involved in a conflict are given the opportunity to voice their concerns. In Mozambique, for example, the involvement of the Italian government, the Vatican, the community of Sant' Egidio, local churches, the British-based company Lonrho, the United Nations, and the American government ensured that simultaneous and complementary negotiating streams took place.

The strategic aim in the coming years must be to create an umbrella of concern that involves the participation of the whole international community. By this I mean that through multiple and complementary action it is possible to generate international political will to resolve such conflicts. Just as interstate diplomacy alone cannot successfully address deep socioeconomic issues, neither can NGOs *alone* generate international political action. The combination of the two forces, however, can bear fruit. In addition, working at a variety of levels ensures that if negotiations fail at one level, it does not necessarily result in a failure of the entire peace process. Whenever there is this umbrella of concern, the greater the likelihood exists of reducing tension and resolving differences. In essence, it is the notion of burden-sharing and strategic alliances that has already proven successful in the campaign against landmines, torture, and environmental destruction. Preventive diplomacy is a means of drawing upon the entire potential of civil societies around the world to transform the handling of "conflict systems" from a reactive one to a preventive one.

Conclusion

It is ironic that throughout the Cold War, the United States, the USSR, and regional powers overtly and covertly intervened in the internal affairs of other states and referred to their actions as "helping democracy" or "bringing freedom." Now, however, when assistance and concern are needed to bring freedom and peace, U.N. member states declare "their deepest concerns" but are unwilling to intervene.

It is not argued that prevention of further violence or the resolution of an ongoing conflict be attempted for purely altruistic reasons. Sociopolitical stability offers opportunities for economic growth and investment, whereas continued insecurity leads to refugee flows and the destabilization of entire regions. Nor is it argued that conflict prevention as discussed above is a quick solution to the world's problems; rather it is a long-term approach requiring long-term financial, technical, and personnel support. The signing of a peace agreement does not bring peace. Peace in internal conflict can only come through a process that involves the very people who were at war with each other. It is they who need to reconcile their differences and reconstruct their lives. Military peace enforcement is a particular tool, not a panacea.

[1] B. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for eace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 7.
[2] Ibid., 11.
[3] J.G. Siccama, ed., *Conflict revention and Earl Warning in the olitical ractice of International Organi-a-tions* (Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 1996).
[4] L. Diamond and J. McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomac* (West Hartford, Conn. Kumarian Press, 1993), 1. This term is also defined as *the web of interconnected parts (activities, individuals, institutions, communities) that operate together…for a common goal; a world at peace.*

Five of the 33 major armed conflicts detailed in the *1994-95 S C R* no longer met the definition in 1995-96. Cease-fire agreements led to suspension of hostilities in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces), Georgia, Rwanda, and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). These and other developments were responsible for an overall decline in major armed conflicts to a post-Cold War low of 30 and the omission of these conflict locations from the *1995-96 S C R*.

It should be noted, however, that renewed hostilities broke out in the United Kingdom in 1996, and remained a possibility in the other four countries, where all had failed to reach peace agreements. The mid-1996 status of the five conflicts are examined below:

Fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, where 90 percent of the population is Armenian, ended after the warring parties signed a May 1994 cease-fire. More than 7,000 individuals perished in the struggle before talks facilitated by the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) succeeded in curtailing the conflict. That cease-fire remained in effect despite stalled mediation efforts of the OSCE and Russia.

U.S.-led negotiations resulted in a February 1994 cease-fire between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces. The "Washington Agreement," signed one month later, established a federation between the two groups. Although implementation of the federal accord proved difficult and relations between Bosnian and Croat leaders remained strained, the agreement succeeded

DEMOGRAPHICS

Civil war has raged across Algeria since the cancellation of Algeria's first multiparty general elections at the beginning of 1992, although outbreaks of violence occurred throughout the 1980s and during preparations for elections in 1991. Current totals of fatalities are usually given at 40,000-50,000, although figures as high as 60,000 are credible. The Islamic Protest movement rose to a peak level of popularity in the local elections of 1990 because of popular dissatisfaction with the regime and an absence of other channels to express political protest.

The current near-civil war broke out when the military took over to prevent an electoral shift from the ruling secular single party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), to a religious single party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The present government banned the FIS, arrested its leaders, and declared a state of emergency, leaving the Islamic movement in the hands of its militant wing. Since then, Islamic terrorist groups, including the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) associated with the FIS, the more radical Islamic Armed Group (GIA), and a scattering of personal bandit bands, have waged a violent campaign to overthrow the government.

The military has responded with counter-terror, regaining the upper hand after 1995, particularly in many rural areas, but still unable to reduce terrorist attacks in the cities and in the countryside around the capital. Rigid government control of the media and terrorist attacks against journalists prevent accurate information, despite the heroism of many Algerian journalists ( ).

In an effort to bring the violence under control and to create a political middle between the warring extremes, eight parties and other organizations, including the FLN and the FIS, met in Rome under the aegis of the Sant Egidio community in September 1994 and January 1995, and issued a platform rejecting violence and calling for the replacement of the government by a sovereign national conference and national elections. The government rejected this proposal and instead seized the initiative, holding presidential elections in November 1995. The elections were free and fair, relatively uninterrupted by violence, and marked a revolutionary event in the process of democratization—the first time ever that the Arab world has seen a competitive multicandidate election for the presidency.

Turnout was about 75 percent of the electorate, significantly higher than that of 1990 and 1991, and the incumbent, former Gen. Liamine Zeroual, was elected by 62 percent of the vote, slightly less than

Since a U.N.-brokered cease-fire agreement in November 1994, Angola's two warring parties—the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—have attempted to bring peace to a country torn apart by 35 years of continuous fighting. Implementation of the Nov. 20, 1994, Lusaka Protocol has been a slow and uneven process, producing an environment of neither war nor peace in this southern African nation.

The peace process is currently overseen by the largest U.N. peacekeeping operation in the world. Headed by U.N. Special Representative (UNSR) Alioune Blondin Maitre Beye, the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was estab-

"As a result of uncontrolled minelaying, there are currently 25,000 amputees in Cambodia, 20,000 in Angola and up to 30,000 in Afghanistan."

DEMOGRAPHICS



Thirteen peace agreements and more than six years after faction leader Charles Taylor's armed insurrection against President Samuel K. Doe's government, Liberia is no closer to peace. Of a pre-war population of 2.5 million, the country's human toll now stands at an estimated 150,000 deaths, one million internally displaced civilians, and an additional 750,000 refugees in neighboring states. In addition, the conflict, which is fundamentally a contest for power and control with ethnic undertones, has given rise to some of the worst looting, banditry, rape, torture, and mass killings on the African continent.

The outlook remains grim: over the past year, the hopeful expectations generated by the Abuja Agreement of August 1995—brokered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—were dashed by the resumption of factional fighting in the capital of Monrovia in April 1996. While the redeployment of the ECOWAS peacekeeping forces (ECOMOG) in Monrovia has since returned some peace and security to the city's streets, factional fighting continues in the west and southeast of the country. Finally, regional governments, NGOs, and the international community as a whole are increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress.

Fighting continued throughout the first half of 1995 between various factions in the southeast (Sinoe and Rivercess counties) and in the west (Bomi and Grand Cape Mount counties), with repeated civilian massacres. The populations of Monrovia and the port city of Buchanan swelled to more than four times their pre-war levels, and several tens of thousands of additional refugees fled to neighboring Guinea and the Côte d'Ivoire. The malnutrition rate for children rose to 42 percent in some areas, and an outbreak of cholera claimed up to 500 lives.

The peace process faltered in early 1995 over the composition and membership of a transitional Council of State, an executive body composed of the major faction leaders. However, a series of meetings paved the way for the Aug. 19, 1995, Abuja Agreement. Abuja created a compromise sixth seat on the Council of State, which began work in September. The agreement also called on ECOMOG to deploy into faction areas and, in cooperation with an expanded U.N. observer force (UNOMIL), to disarm the factions.

A lack of funding for ECOMOG delayed both deployment and disarmament and laid the ground for the fighting that finally broke out on April 6, 1996, when troops from Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Al-Haji Kromah's United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO-K) tried to arrest ethnic Krahn faction leader Roosevelt Johnson in Monrovia. ECOMOG peacekeepers redeployed in Monrovia after seven

ECOMOG: the ECOWAS (Economic Organization of West African States) Monitoring Group

NPFL: National Patriotic Front for Liberia

*In August 1995, seven armed factions in Liberia (including the NPLF) signed a peace agreement, and their leaders formed a transitional Council of State. Elections were scheduled for August 1996.
** No figures for battle-related deaths are available. War-related deaths (military and civilian) are estimated at 10,000-15,000 in 1995. Total war-related deaths are estimated at 150,000.
***Note: this figure includes the fighting in 1990-91 (incurring 15,000 deaths) in which more than the two parties listed above participated.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," *SIPRI 1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.

1989 **1990** **1993** **1995**

Five years of civil conflict came to an apparent end with the presidential run-off election victory of Ahmad Tejan Kaba on March 15, 1996. The election became possible when Foday Sankoh, leader of

munities formed the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), which attacked the NPFL in Sierra Leone and Liberia from bases in Sierra Leone. The NPFL was forced to retreat into Liberia, and the RUF began to operate on its own and focused on controlling the diamond-rich region district of Kono and the provincial towns of Bo and Kenema.

The conflict in Sierra Leone has resulted in terrible civilian hardships. RUF and government forces have frequently targeted towns and villages, resulting in high numbers of civilian casualties. Fighting has forced even more to flee their homes. The total number of internally displaced and refugee Sierra Leoneans is estimated to be 2.1 million, or 47 percent of the country's total population of 4.47 million people. However, with the March elections having apparently succeeded, and negotiations under way for a permanent peace, Sierra Leoneans may be returning to their homes soon.

J L T C C ' L M 1995. H ' A O L P C 1985-87.

RUF: Revolutionary United Front

* Approximately 30,000 war-related deaths since 1991.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," *SIPRI 1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.



HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Source: UNICEF, *T S C 1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

* Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," *T M B 1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 269. SIPRI, *A T D*, 1996.

1971 **1981** **1991** **1992**

SOMALIA

DEMOGRAPHICS



Source: F F M , C I R w © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 187.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, M B (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 255. UNDP, H D R 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 157.

BY KEN MENKHAUS

Five years after the overthrow of Siad Barre in January 1991, Somalia remains plagued by widespread armed conflict and without a recognized government. In 1991-92, southern Somalia was devastated by factional warfare over control of the government, key cities, riverine areas, and humanitarian relief supplies. That conflict pitted the Somali National Alliance (SNA), led by Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed, against a loose coalition known as the "Group of 12," nominally headed by Ali Mahdi of the United Somali Congress (USC).

Heavy fighting and banditry between the SNA and USC destroyed most of the capital Mogadishu, while recurrent battles in the countryside between the SNA and Darod clan militias triggered a massive famine in southern Somalia. Only the northeast and northwest regions of Somalia were spared. An estimated 300,000 Somalis lost their lives to famine and 30,000 to war in 1991-92. To end the famine, 37,000 multinational troops were deployed in the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) from December 1992 to May 1993. Its successor, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM II), was given an expansive mandate to facilitate national reconciliation, reconstruction, and disarmament.

T , 37,000 w O.S.- O T F (ONITAF) D 1992 M 1993.

Despite a national peace accord signed in March 1993 and dozens of subsequent peace initiatives, national reconciliation was never achieved. The U.N. operation was derailed when it became embroiled in protracted hostilities with Aideed's militia; when it

withdrew from Somalia in March 1995, it left behind a country still divided and without a central government.

Since March 1995, the nature of armed conflict in Somalia has shifted, with as many outbreaks of violence within clans and factions as between them. Triggered by struggles over leadership, scarce resources, and valued real estate, these hostilities have tended to be localized and sporadic, but have yielded hundreds of casualties.

Much of the fighting has occurred in Mogadishu, where hostilities broke out in March and April 1995 between rival Hawiye subclans scrambling to occupy strategic locations vacated by departing U.N. forces. A split between Aideed and his former financial backer, Osman Atto, led to heavy intermittent fighting between their rival subclans in south Mogadishu since July 1995. Aideed's militia also fought Ali Mahdi's USC along the city's "Green Line" for control of the airport and seaport, both of which were shut down in October 1995. [Gen. Aideed died Aug. 1, 1996, after suffering gun wounds in a battle in Mogadishu, and was replaced as head of the SNA by his 33-year-old son, Hussein Mohammed Farah Aideed.—Editor]

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1950 **1960** **1969**

Armed conflicts have flared in the Somali countryside too. The most significant include the military occupation of the city of Baidoa by Aideed's SNA forces, which have encountered armed resistance from inhabitants; SNA forays along the Jubba river against rival militias; a "banana war" in the Shabelle valley, between rival Hawiye subclans, over control of banana exports; and protracted armed conflict in the northwest, between the forces of the self-proclaimed government of "Somaliland" and rival clan militias.

Collectively, these conflicts are creating famine conditions in some regions and threaten to erupt into full-scale civil war. In the aftermath of the failed U.N. peace operation, modest efforts to reconcile Somali factions have been made by the Organization for African Unity, Ethiopia, and the factions themselves, but with no success.

D . K M D
C . I 1993-94, U.N.
O S 1994-95 w U.S.
A P I . H
S , S
S 1996 International Peacekeeping.

USC: United Somali Congress

*Taken to be the USC faction (Mahdi).

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," *SIPRI 1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 29.

DEFENSE

1977 1988 1991 1994

Regional response to the regime became linked to international concern with terrorism. In January 1996, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution demanding that Sudan hand over the terrorists within 90 days. With the expiration of the deadline, Sudan became threatened with the imposition of severe sanctions. Egypt, however, opposed tough sanctions on the Sudan, fearing a Southern rebel movement that could impose a political solution detrimental to the unity of the country. Since the terrorist profile of the regime is disconnected from its domestic policies, the international community remains only marginally concerned about the war in the south and the cause of democracy and human rights in the country as a whole.

D . F M D w A P - B I ' F P S P . H U.N. - . H S C , S - , U S , w S ' .

CONFLICT REGION:

ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

BANGLADESH

CAMBODIA

INDIA

INDONESIA

MYANMAR/BURMA

PHILIPPINES

SRI LANKA

TAJIKISTAN

Afghanistan	12	27	1.2
Bangladesh	97	35	2.1
Cambodia	36	35	3.1
India	81	48	2.1
Indonesia	62	82	1.8
Myanmar/Burma	38	81	2.1
Philippines	85	94	2.2
Sri Lanka	53	89	1.4
Tajikistan	na	98*	2.9
Asia Conflict Countries Average	58.0	65.4	2.10**
Overall Asia Average	66.6	72.7	1.97
South Asia Average	61.3	42.0	2.10
East Asia & Pacific Average	66.7	79.4	1.97

* Data refers to years or periods other than those specified, or pertains to a region of a given country rather than the entire country, or differs in some way from the standard definition.
** Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by

AFGHANISTAN

Since the fall of ex-Communist President Najibullah in April 1992, Afghanistan has suffered from a new civil war. When the USSR dissolved and the Communist regime fell, the Islamic groups ([illegible]) that had fought him and the Soviet Army could not agree on a successor government. Former [illegible] and army factions devastated the capital, Kabul, as they fought for power.

There have been four main combatants, the first being the predominantly Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society), led by "President" Burhanuddin Rabbani and military commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, which controls northeast Afghanistan and the capital, and therefore claims to be the government, which has been aided by Russia, India, and Iran. The second combatant has been the predominantly Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, supported by Pakistan, which attacked Kabul. A third combatant has been the Shia Hizb-i-Wahdat (Unity Party), supported by Iran, which controlled part of Kabul and central Afghanistan. And finally, the fourth combatant has been a faction of

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. $)

1994 total (million)
(1993 constant prices): na

1994 per capita
(1993 constant prices): na

Top major conventional weapons exporters:*

1995:
Imports not listed from 1992-95

1990-95:
Russia/USSR 3,660
Saudi Arabia 18

*Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices
** Deliveries from Saudi Arabia are to rebel forces.

Sources: IISS, "International

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," [illegible] *1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26.

1978	1979	1989	1992
PDPA stages Marxist coup, kills Daoud, establishes single-party state	USSR invades to support PDPA against the Islamic *mujahideen*	USSR withdraws troops; *mujahideen* establish government-in-exile	*Mujahideen* invade Kabul; Soviet-installed regime collapses

BANGLADESH

The past year witnessed little change in the low-level guerrilla conflict that has plagued the Chittagong Hill Tract (CHT) region of Bangladesh since the early 1970s. Comprising some 10 percent of Bangladesh and covering an area of more than 5,000 square miles, the CHT is the ancestral home to 12 recognized tribal populations representing Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian communities. Strife continues to plague the region as the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (JSS) and its military wing, Shanti Bahini (SB), maintain their armed struggle against the government in Dhaka.

In 1972, one year after Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan, tribal elements in the CHT formed the JSS in response to numerous outstanding grievances, including compensation for a 1963 hydroelectric project that displaced more than 100,000 indigenous people from their ancestral lands and government settlement policies that opened the CHT to successive waves of Bengali settlers from the plains. In 1973, the JSS created the SB to forcefully agitate for tribal rights and

CAMBODIA

Historically, Cambodia has experienced both internal strife and external interference, particularly from more powerful neighbors. After Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953, Prince Norodom Sihanouk's efforts in the 1950s and 1960s to pursue a policy of neutrality became inextricably caught up in the crosscurrents of the Cold War. By the mid-1960s, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong guerrillas were using the eastern region of Cambo-

INDIA

During the last year, two conflicts continued to cause political instability in India: the insurgency in the northern province of Kashmir and the ethnic conflict in the state of Assam in the northeast. In contrast, the trouble-prone state of Punjab was relatively calm.

In Kashmir, Indian security forces were still engaged in attempts to quell the militant insurgency, which has claimed more than 20,000 lives since 1990. The militants are demanding independence or accession to Pakistan. June 1996 parliamentary elections and the possibility of local elections in late 1996 have raised hopes of the return of popular government to the province after six years of direct rule from New Delhi. But Kashmir will continue to remain a troubled area even if the security forces succeed in combatting the insurgency. Resentment at New Delhi's policies is intense and widespread, and the large-scale human rights violations by Indian security forces over the last six years have further estranged the people from India. Punjab's Sikh Separatists are fighting a losing battle with very little popular support left in the state for an independent Sikh nation, Khalistan.

[illegible]

Only stray incidents of violence are reported, and the average level of violence in Punjab today is no higher than most states in India. In 1995, one separatist group did succeed in assassinating Punjab's chief minister, Beant Singh, but this was clearly the last gasp of a dying militant campaign. The most sig-

178 T 30

HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 60

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	96
DPT	91
polio	91
measles	86

% population with access to health services: 85

Source: UNICEF, [illegible] *1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 7,321

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 8

Top major conventional weapons exporters:*

1995:

Russia/USSR	440
UK	112
Netherlands	71

1990-95:

Russia/USSR	4,664
UK	625
Netherlands	426

*Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," [illegible] *1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 269. SIPRI, *A* [illegible] *D* [illegible], *1996*.

INDONESIA

In the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, the "Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor" (known by its Portuguese acronym Fretilin) has waged a campaign for independence against the Indonesian authorities, who occupied the territory after Dec. 7, 1975, after the Marxist-influenced Fretilin declared independence nine days earlier. The nature of the East Timor conflict has altered since the Indonesian invasion more than 20 years ago, with ethnic and religious divisions (most East Timorese profess Roman Catholic Christianity) exacerbating the conflict.

From a preinvasion population of more than 600,000 people, the loss of life occurring in the first decade after the Indonesian invasion may have been as high as 200,000, with famine and disease inflicting high mortality on Timorese civilians herded into holding camps during 1975-79. In 1976, Jakarta annexed East Timor as Indonesia's 27th province; 20 years later, riots and repression continue.

Indonesian counterinsurgency efforts have been rewarded with sporadic success, the most recent being the capture and imprisonment of Fretilin leader

"THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO, WHO HAS RULED INDONESIA FOR 30 YEARS, IS RESPONDING TO UNPRECEDENTED POLITICAL CHALLENGES WITH ILL-JUDGED REPRESSION."

E EC , "IF INDONESIA ERUPTS," AUG. 3, 1996—ONE WEEK AFTER AT LEAST TWO PEOPLE WERE KILLED, AS MANY AS 100 INJURED, AND 200 MORE JAILED WHEN INDONESIA'S WORST RIOTING IN 22 YEARS BROKE OUT IN JAKARTA FOLLOWING A POLICE AND GOVERNMENT-BACKED CIVILIAN RAID ON THE HEADQUARTERS OF OUSTED OPPOSITION LEADER MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI TO EVICT HER SUPPORTERS

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.$)

1994 total (million)
(1993 constant prices): 2,256

1994 per capita
(1993 constant prices): 11

Top major conventional weapons exporters:*

1995:

MYANMAR/BURMA

Since the Burma Communist Party (BCP) revolted against the government three months after independence in 1948, warfare between the state and ethnic opposition groups has continued. While the BCP fought to replace the democratic government, several minorities fought either for greater autonomy and power in their states or to secede from the Union of Burma. After nearly five decades, neither the democratic government nor the military dictatorships, which seized power in 1962, have been able to end civil war.

For the past eight years, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has sought to end

HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994:	57
% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:	
TB	83
DPT	77
polio	77
measles	77
% population with access to health services:	60

Source: UNICEF, [illegible] *1996*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 80, 84.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices):	415
1994 per capita (1993 constant prices):	9
Top major conventional weapons exporters:*	
1995:	
China	310
1990-95:	
China	1,035
Poland	47
Yugoslavia	42

*Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices
** All deliveries ended in 1992 before the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," [illegible] *1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 266. SIPRI, [illegible] *1996*.

INN ACTION

President Jimmy Carter and INN members Oscar Arias Sánchez, Lisbet Palme, and Elie Wiesel participated in a letter-writing campaign that contributed to the July 11, 1995, release of democratic leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. Human Rights Watch organized the campaign to pressure Burma's ruling military regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), to free the Nobel laureate Suu Kyi after six years of detention. Carter Center Conflict Resolution Program Director Harry Barnes met with Suu Kyi in March 1996 in Burma and heard her plans for rebuilding the National League for Democracy (NLD) party. Upon his return, Barnes debriefed several NGOs in New York on Suu Kyi's suggestions for how international NGOs might support the democratic movement in Burma. The NGOs discussed the possible creation of an informal consultative mechanism to coordinate information-sharing and travel to the region.

KNU: Karen National Union
MTA: Mong Tai Army, which was formed in 1987; it is unclear, however, when the demand for independence was stated.

* This figure includes deaths only in the Shan conflict.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," [illegible] *1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 27.

1988	1990	1992	1995
SLORC takes power in bloody civil war, suppresses mass democratic uprisings	SLORC ignores results of democratic elections, maintains power	Thailand pressures SLORC to negotiate cease-fire agreements with ethnic groups	Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi released from six years of house arrest

SRI LANKA

DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 24,962 sq. mi. (64,652 sq. km.)

Population: 18,240,000

System of Government:
Socialist Republic

Languages:
English
Sinhala
Tamil

Ethnic Divisions:

Sinhalese	74%
Ceylon Tamil	10%
Moor	7%
Indian Tamil	6%
Other	3%

Religions:

Buddhist	69%
Hindu	15%
Muslim	8%
Christian	8%

Source: From [illegible] © 1996 by Rand McNally, R.L. 96-S-107, 189-90.

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP):*
U.S. $10.9 billion

GDP per capita:*
U.S. $3,200

External debt:*
U.S. $7.2 billion

Human Development Index (HDI), 1992:
0.704

* 1994 estimated

Sources: IISS, [illegible] *1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1995), 164. UNDP, [illegible] *1995* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 156.

BY DONNA HICKS

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been fighting for a separate Tamil state consisting of northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka since 1983. Following the assassination of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May 1993, the LTTE increased its attacks on Sri Lankan forces. With the August 1994 election of a moderate president, Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga, the government's gestures, including the partial lifting of an economic embargo against LTTE-controlled areas, led to preliminary peace talks with the LTTE in October 1994.

After the LTTE and the new Sri Lankan government (People's Alliance) agreed to a cessation of hostilities in November 1994, there was much hope that the decade-long civil war might be nearing an end. Formal peace began in late January 1995 when an official delegation from the government was sent to Jaffna to meet with the LTTE and begin discussions on unresolved issues at the core of the conflict. The government agreed to lift the embargo in the LTTE-held areas in the north, although the LTTE claimed there was little actual compliance on the part of the government.



On April 19, 1995, the five-month cessation of hostilities ended when four LTTE suicide bombers blew up two navy vessels in Trincomalee Harbor in the eastern part of the island, resulting in many deaths. Pressure built for a military response by the government even as the president went forward with plans to release and implement a peace package offering political reforms and devolution to all sections of the country. In July and September, major military offensives, launched by government forces in the Jaffna area, resulted in the loss of civilian lives and produced some 400,000-500,000 refugees. In January 1996, the retaliatory suicide bombing by the LTTE of the financial center in Colombo caused nearly 100 civilian deaths. At mid-year, there appeared to be little hope for resumption of peace talks in the near future.



On April 19, 1996, the government extended a countrywide state of emergency and launched Riviresa II, a major military offensive in the Jaffna peninsula. The offensive resulted in the government takeover of Jaffna and adjoining areas, expelling the LTTE from its home and headquarters. Efforts were under way in early July by the government for the return of the refugees to Jaffna. Defense Ministry sources reported that during the past year, as a result of the conflict, more than 6,300 people were killed, including more than 1,000 civilians.

CONFLICT TIMELINE

1948	1956	1971
Britain grants independence; UNP party forms first coalition government	SLFP party wins elections	Government suppresses JVP uprising

"THE LATEST MILITARY OFFENSIVE HAS COST THE GOVERNMENT DEARLY IN ECONOMIC TERMS. DEFENSE SPENDING, WHICH ROSE TO $600 MILLION IN 1995, WILL RISE EVEN FURTHER, TO $775 MILLION IN 1996."

Kalpana Isaac, "Sri Lanka's Ethnic Divide," C[illegible], April 1996

HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 72

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	86
DPT	88
polio	88
measles	84

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.$)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 504

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 28

Top major conventional weapons exporters:*

1995:

Ukraine	43

1990-95:

China	115
Ukraine	47
Russia/USSR	21

*Trend-indicators; U.S. $ million at 1990 constant prices

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," [illegible] *1995-96* (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 266. SIPRI, *A[illegible] D[illegible], 1996.*

TAJIKISTAN

Tajikistan, the poorest of the former Soviet republics, declared independence in August 1991 but was unprepared both politically and economically. In 1992 and early 1993, this country of 5.5 million experienced a vicious internal conflict resulting in deaths with estimates ranging from 25,000 to 200,000 victims and an estimated one-in-seven fleeing their homes.

The battle lines were drawn in complex ways—between clan-based regional power centers aspiring to rule, between traditional-minded leaders bred in the Communist system and new democrats, between militant Islamists and the government. In April 1994, an emissary of the U.N. secretary-general launched negotiations between the government and the opposition—a coalition of secular democratic and national forces and both political and military Islamists.

The negotiations continued haltingly through March

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.$)

1994 total (million)
(1993 constant prices): 66

1994 per capita
(1993 constant prices): 11

Top major conventional

CONFLICT REGION:

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

COLOMBIA

GUATEMALA

PERU

Human Development Indicators

Country	Access to safe water	Total adult literacy	Population growth rate
Colombia	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Guatemala	32	42	3.0
Peru	46	34	3.2
Conflict Countries Average	52.3	43.7	2.30*
Over[illegible] American and Caribbean Average	[illegible]	72.0	[illegible]

* Averages are derived from calculations based on data given by UNICEF but do not represent figures provided directly by UNICEF.

Source: UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 82-84.

Arms Flows

Total imports of major conventional weapons from 1990-95. Figures represent trend-indicator values (volume in numbers and capacity of transfers rather than real money flows) of arms imported to each Central and South American country engaged in a major armed conflict in 1995 (U.S. $ million at constant 1990 prices).

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Colombia	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Peru	102	63	124	92	60	0

No imports of major conventional weapons were recorded for Guatemala for 1990-95.

Source: SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, 1996.

Aid Flows

Total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, multilateral organizations, and Arab [illegible] tries to developing countries and territories (U.S. $ million for 1994)

Colombia	127
Guatemala	224
Peru	416
Total Latin American & Caribbean	5,710

* The DAC is one of a number of specialized committees of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which includes 16 Western European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the C[illegible]

Source: © Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), [illegible] Development Co-operation: *Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee*, Report 1995, A54-56. Reproduced by permission of the OECD.

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

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HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

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DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. $)

1994 total (million)
(1993 constant prices): 1,178

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1970	1979	1984	1991
ANAPO challenges election results; M-19 group launches guerrilla warfare	United States, Colombia sign extradition treaty	National state of emergency called amid political, drug-related violence	FARC, ELN launch guerrilla attacks against government

GUATEMALA

PERU



War is a devastating force whose impact on civilians is far greater than on the armies of the warring parties themselves. UNICEF notes in that civilians accounted for approximately 14 percent of war-time deaths in World War I, 70 percent in World War II, and by 1990, the total had reached almost 90 percent. Among these civilians are millions of children, who have always suffered in times of war but who have increasingly come under fire in recent years as more conflicts take place within nations rather than between them.

In the post-Cold War conflict, battles are fought not in the skies above or across distant borders, but in towns and villages. The weapons of choice are not always the high-tech missiles of Desert Storm but light and cheap guns, inexpensive landmines and mortars, even rocks and machetes. These realities place the noncombatant, and especially the child, in the middle of the fighting, used more and more not only as targets but as shields, weapons, recruits, and hostages in ethnic and other civil wars.

Easy Targets

More than 2 million children have been killed in the last decade by war, and indirect effects of war such as famine and malnutrition are responsible for millions more child deaths. Those who escape death by bullets, bombs, or starvation face other horrible fates. Child victims of war include 4 to 5 million disabled, more than 1 million orphaned or separated from their parents, and some 10 million psychologically traumatized. Children represent more than half of the 53 million people who have been forced to flee their homes from war.

Military commanders have deliberately targeted children in war. There are reports of landmines being disguised as toys and planted near schools and playgrounds where children find them. In ethnic wars, enemy groups attempt to justify the mass slaughter of children, such as the 300,000 killed in Rwanda in 1994, by viewing children as the potential future enemy. Conscription of children as young as 10 has been reported in some countries in Africa. In 1988, some 200,000 children fought in wars, and recently, thousands of children under 16 have fought in wars in as many as 25 countries. Light and efficient weapons can easily turn inexperienced children into killers: A child of 10 can strip and reassemble an AK-47 rifle, which can cost as little as $6 in West Africa. Child soldiers have been forced to kill members of their own families and walk ahead of advancing armies as human shields.

The prominent disregard for human life during wartime extends readily and easily to include children in all its aspects. Children are more susceptible to disease and malnutrition, and children die in large numbers without access to food and medicine. Shortages of these supplies are frequently the result of delays in humanitarian relief convoys or flights held up by insecurity, mined roads, and government or rebel intransigence. Small hands quickly lose skirmishes in refugee camps over food. Landmines that might merely incapacitate an adult can kill or severely maim small children.

The consequence of this lack of concern for child welfare in war is the creation of an adult who potentially knows only paths to violence and has only disregard for human life. As INN member and Swedish Committee for UNICEF President Lisbet Palme said in the *4*

CONFLICT REGION:

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CROATIA

RUSSIA (CHECHNYA)

B A



Republic

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95), 79.

Operation Joint Endeavor to replace the United Nations humanitarian operation (UNPRO-

n.

8, 1992

nsistence on

mpted European

or ethnic cantoniza-

osnian Serb party (SDS),

National Army, chose separa-

ion by force or terror of all non-

s they claimed.

nian Croat party (HDZ), aided by the

an Army, rapidly integrated contiguous terri-

ies into neighboring Croatia and moved to puri-

fy and separate areas of central Bosnia shared with Muslims. The rump Bosnian presidency and Bosnian Muslim party (SDA) fought on two fronts for survival and the creation of a new state.

Eight peace plans later—with more than half of the pre-war population of 4.4 million living as refugees or displaced to create ethnically pure regions, more than 100,000 dead, and a country in near total ruin—the Dayton accords divided the country into two entities, a federation of Croats and Muslims (created by an agreement signed in Washington in March 1994) and a Serb Republic.

In the first six months of 1995, IFOR successfully separated warring parties, destroyed or cordoned heavy weapons, and oversaw demobilization. In the spring of 1996, an international civilian operation

FLICT TIMELINE

1944
Tito creates Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of six Yugoslav republics

1954
Yugoslavia guarantees freedom of religion

1968
Bosnian Central Committee confirms Muslims as distinct nation

New Yugoslav constitution recognizes Muslims as separate constituency

Tito dies; nationalism re-emerges within republics

Serbian leader Milosevic ignites Serb nationalism with Battle of Kosovo speech

Bosnia declares independence; war with Croatian and Yugoslav armies begins

C A A

As conflict continued in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue that sparked the wars of Yugoslav succession in 1991—the status of the Serb minority within Croatia—remained no closer to settlement. A cease-fire from 1992, monitored by a U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), had separated the Croatian forces from those of the rebel Serbs and ended violent conflict, which had caused the death of more than 10,000 and the displacement of hundreds of thousands. But the conflicting positions—Croatia's demand for territorial sovereignty versus the desire of the "Serbian Republic of Krajina" for independence and unification with other Serbian-controlled lands—did not soften. With no progress being made toward the reintegration of the territory or the return of refugees, Croatia threatened repeatedly to expel the U.N. peacekeepers.

The renegotiation of the U.N. mandate in March 1995 reduced the U.N. deployment from 18,000 to 5,000 and shifted the focus from patrolling between the parties to monitoring Croatia's international borders with Serbia and Bosnia. It thus opened the way for the military assaults that would, in a matter of hours, crush the four-year-long Serb rebellion.

With the international presence out of the way, Croatia staged two blitzkrieg attacks, achieving the total collapse of the Serbian entity, as well as the single

that it was in complete control of the territory. An estimated 180,000 Serbs fled across the border to Serb-held territory in Bosnia and on to Serbia, where some were resci2pl8.84 0cI54.9(ARE)]TJ/F7 13 Tw 517.8901 5.tary Balancee41.9 4n c[osovo. I01 5is5.

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*This includes the fighting during 1991 in which more than just the two parties participated.

Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995,")) , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24.

HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE

Life expectancy at birth (years), 1994: 71

% fully immunized 1-year-old children, 1990-94:

TB	92
DPT	85
polio	85
measles	90

% population with access to health services: na

Source: UNICEF, , (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 81, 85.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S. $)

1994 total (million) (1993 constant prices): 1,089

1994 per capita (1993 constant prices): 229

Top major conventional weapons exporters:*
Imports of major conventional weapons were not listed in 1991-95.

*SIPRI notes, however, that in spite of the arms embargo on the former Yugoslav countries, "there are indications, in some cases even concrete proof, that at least Croatia and Bosnia received major conventional weapons in spite of the embargoes."

Sources: IISS, "International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower in 1985, 1993, and 1994," (London: by Permission of Oxford University Press, 1996), 264. SIPRI,

1980	1990	1991	1995
Tito's death fuels Croat demands for greater autonomy	Ethnic Serbs declare autonomy for the Krajina; Croatia holds free elections	Croatia declares independence, begins war against Serb, Bosnian forces	Serbs driven from Krajina; Dayton agreement ends 43 months of fighting

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN CHECHNYA: ACCESS DENIED



Source: M. Sollenberg et. al. in Sollenberg and Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts, 1995," (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 24.

1979	1989	1991	1994
Soviet troops invade Afghanistan	Soviet authorities appoint native Chechen administrators to govern Chechnya	Gen. Dudayev overthrows Chechnya's Communist government, declares independence	Fighting erupts among Chechen factions; Russian troops invade

Focus: War Crimes Tribunals

Rwanda

Former Yugoslavia

Crimes Against Humanity:

Genocide:

War Crimes:

MIDDLE EAST

IRAN

IRAQ

ISRAEL

TURKEY

[illegible]

[illegible] in [illegible], Dec. 10, 1994

D [illegible]

	% [illegible] (1 0- 5)	(% 1 0)	(1 0- 4)
[illegible]	4	62	3.7
[illegible]	44	52	3.0
[illegible]		2*	2.4
[illegible]	0	7	2.2
[illegible] A [illegible]	6 .3	71.3	2. 3**
[illegible] A [illegible]	30.7	73.6	3.07

[illegible] *[illegible] of the World's Children 1996*

A [illegible]

[illegible] 1 0- 5. E [illegible] 1 5- [illegible] 1 0 [illegible].

	1 0	1 1	1 2	1 3	1 4	1 5
[illegible]	777	703	2 3	1,2 5	52	1 7
[illegible]	643	0	0	0	0	0
[illegible]	2	1,30	1,0 6	5 5	76	327
[illegible]	01	54	1,63	2,2	2,0	1,127

A.m [illegible] Dhaka

-5 [illegible]

[illegible] 1 4 [illegible] -5 [illegible] 15 [illegible] 1,000 [illegible] 1 5 [illegible]

57	71
70	55
75	51
1	40
2	3
4	36
6	27
[illegible]	25
106	20
121	14
131	
[illegible] A [illegible]	46.5
[illegible] A [illegible]	35.1

[illegible] of the World's Children 1996

A [illegible]

[illegible] (D [illegible] 1 4).*

[illegible]	131
[illegible]	25
[illegible]	1,237
[illegible]	47
[illegible]	163
[illegible]	4,553

IRAN

DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 632,457 sq. mi.
(1,638,057 sq. km.)

Population: 63,810,000

System of Government:

[illegible] 100,000 [illegible] in neighb[illegible] [illegible] in Baghdad. [illegible] Army ([illegible]A), in [illegible] 40 [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] in the BA [illegible] Emory University, [illegible] Center [illegible] in the Conflict [illegible] A U[illegible] foreign [illegible] in 1988, the [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] 1996

the [illegible] Bosnia 1995-96

1979

Shah flees; Ayatollah Khomeini proclaims Islamic republic, takes U.S. hostages

1988

Iran, Iraq sign cease-fire after eight years of war

1989

Khomeini dies; Rafsanjani elected president

1991

Iraqi refugees flood Iran during Gulf War; Mujahideen e-Khalq, KDPI rebel

IRAQ





Ba'th party comes to power,

ISRAEL

DEMOGRAPHICS

Area: 8,019 sq. mi.
(420,770 sq. km.)

Population: 5,059,000

System of Government:
Republic

Languages:
Hebrew
Arabic

1973

Yom Kippur War erupts; Egypt reoccupies Sinai; warring parties sign cease-fire

1979

Israel and Egypt sign Camp David Agreement

1987

Palestinian Intifadah uprising begins

1993

Oslo process leads to Israeli-Jordanian Agreement

TURKEY



		500,000 10,000-12,000
D 1 5	4,000	
D	17,000	

b 1996

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE

(All figures U.S.$)

1994 total (million)
(1993 constant prices): 5,242

1 4
(1 3) 6

*

1 5

4 0
406
126

1 0- 5

6,560

1,636
1

1974

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) forms; Turkey invades north Cyprus

1984

PKK launches guerrilla campaign to establish independent Kurdistan

1992

Government raids PKK military bases in northern Iraq

1993

Tansu Ciller becomes prime minister; 3,000 killed in Kurdish struggle

An Interview with Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter

This past year was another challenging and rewarding one for The Carter Center and President and Mrs. Carter. Among other achievements, The Carter Center and its partners convened two heads-of-state summits on the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi and monitored the Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Conflict Resolution Program staff members spoke with the former president and first lady in June 1996 about their approach to conflict resolution, their collaboration with others, and the state of world conflict today.

[illegible] ?

President Carter: Well, I don't feel that it requires courage, because I don't have anything to risk. I believe that a major purpose of The Carter Center is to fill vacuums—when it is obvious that no international organization or government has been able to resolve a specific crisis, then naturally that gives us the opportunity to act.

Mrs. Carter: One thing that is unique about The Carter Center is that we look for situations that need help, where others have not been successful or are not involved.

[illegible] ?

President Carter: The most vivid examples are the two that occurred in 1994. One involved North Korea. We were facing a possible war on the Korean Peninsula—the Chinese thought so, I thought so, and the commanding general of the U.S. forces in South Korea thought so. Had the U.N. Security Council gone through with the resolution branding North Korea as an outlaw nation and branding their revered leader a criminal, North Korea told us they were prepared to go to war. This was a perfect example of a vacuum to be filled. The U.S. government refused to have any direct communications with the leaders in Pyongyang, the United Nations was unable to do so, but The Carter Center was free to go in at the invitation of then-North Korean President Kim Il Sung and the approval of the White House.

Later on that year, with the Haitian crisis, 30,000 troops were marshaled and poised to invade Haiti, which, I think, would have been very costly in Haitian lives. At the last minute, we got permission from the White House to go in. When our efforts are approved by Washington, and we see a real need to resolve a crisis, it doesn't require courage because we feel that we are welcome, and we might

[illegible] 1996. [illegible]

potentially be successful. These are the kinds of issues where we find ourselves filling a need when others either will not or cannot.

Mrs. Carter: We have opportunities that a lot of other people don't have. We get to know the leaders in the countries—sometimes revolutionaries as well—when we are there because of health and agriculture programs or other Carter Center programs. Also, one main factor is that people trust Jimmy largely because of his

human rights policy when he was in the White House. He tried to be fair, and he had the reputation of being fair and caring for people. That makes a lot of difference in the way people accept and trust him and think he will be even-handed if a conflict occurs.

.D [illegible] ?

President Carter: Yes, but I think you must look at The Carter Center independent of me. Concerning North Korea, for example, we not only had information from the U.S. government, much of which was erroneous, but we also had information from CNN and evidence from Billy Graham and others who had actually been there. The reservoir of material that The Carter Center staff develops in preparation for this kind of trip is a precious possession for us. , and wit ina few daylsIe hada-

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utua,

President Carter: Rosalynn does more than that. She's in the room, and the ostensible purpose is that she is taking notes. Of course, quite often, the leaders don't want anyone else in the room. They want to deal with me personally. But Rosalynn is kind of an extension of me. Afterwards, she and I confer. She knows as much about the issues as I do...

Mrs. Carter: I read all the briefings he gets.

President Carter: (laughing) ... and she tells me what to do.

Mrs. Carter: If I think he's pressing too hard, I'll pass him a note and say—

President Carter: —"back off." That's the part she likes the best. Sometimes you achieve a real breakthrough by building personal relationships. We would never have succeeded in Haiti if we had not gone to meet Haitian leader Gen. Raoul Cedras' wife. And I don't think we would have had any breakthrough in North Korea unless we had gone out on a boat for five or six hours with Kim Il Sung and

1995

his wife. While public opinion is still against Rosalynn and my being fairly close to Zaire President Mobutu and his wife and his daughter, these kinds of personal connections are very important.

Mrs. Carter: We would like to have peace in Liberia and an election and stabilized political situations in Burundi and Rwanda.

President Carter: A successful election in Zaire. Peace in Sudan. These are areas in which we are already deeply involved. And we'll help in the Middle East when called upon; I think that our role in the January 1996 Palestinian elections was very important.

President Carter: Those that we just mentioned. We obviously have been concerned about Burma, but we never have been able to get approval for The Carter Center to come in. We're concerned about Cuba. There again, we will monitor the situation, but we haven't entered directly because the opportunities are not there yet. We are poised, and once we get—even if at the last minute—an opportunity to move, we can move in a hurry based on the previous work we have done.

President Carter: One of the things we have accomplished in the Great Lakes is that we have refocused world attention on it, though that is still not enough. In fact, the U.S. government has become directly involved as a result of what The Carter Center and others have done there. They just weren't interested until we began to raise the visibility of this crisis. So, one of the things that gives me hope for the future is at least the possibility that there will be a more constant and effective melding of official and nongovernmental organizations, as is the case now in some countries, such as Norway. And I would hope that in the future the United Nations and the U.S. government, when they can't successfully resolve a crisis on their own, will naturally turn to NGOs—not particularly as partners, but as a second or sometimes a primary channel. That's a hope I have, but it hasn't been realized yet.

Mrs. Carter: Also, despite always hearing in the news about all the bad things going on around the world, when we travel to see the progress of our projects, in Africa for instance, we see many good things happening, too. People getting better health care, being able to grow their own food—those things that can prevent war. Seeing those things happening now in so many of the countries gives us hope that they might spread to those places where the conflicts are now.

RESOURCES

General Conflict Resolution

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Holsti, Kalevi J.

African Development Bank (ADB)
Established in 1963, the Bank began operations in July 1966 with the aim of financing economic and social development in African countries. 52 members.
Headquarters: 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d'Ivoire
Secretary-General: Hedi Meliane

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Created through the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and to increase the stability of the South East Asian region. 7 members.
Headquarters: 70a Jalan Sisingamangaraja, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia
Address: P.O. Box 2072, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia
Secretary-General: Ajijt Singh (Malaysia)

Commonwealth of Nations (CW)
A free association of sovereign independent states with no charter, treaty, or constitution, first defined by the Imperial Conference of 1926 to include a group of "autonomous Communities within the British Empire," the modern Commonwealth was born in 1949. 51 members.
Headquarters: Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London, SW1Y 5HX, UK
Secretary-General: Chief E. Chukwuemeka (Emeka) Anyaoku (Nigeria)

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Established by the 1975 Treaty of Lagos with the object of promoting trade, cooperation, and self-reliance in West Africa. 16 members.
Headquarters: Secretariat Building, Asokoro, Abuja, Nigeria
Executive Secretary: Edouard E. Benjamin (Guinea)

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Founded in 1990 to contribute to the progress and economic reconstruction of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and put into practice the principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a market economy. 57 members.
Headquarters: One Exchange Square, 175 Bishopsgate, London EC2A 2EH, England
President: Jacques de Larosière (France)

European Union (EU)
The European Economic Community (EEC) was formally changed to the European Community (effective November 1993). The new Treaty established a European Union (EU), which aimed to increase intergovernmental cooperation in economic and monetary affairs; establish a common foreign and security policy; and introduce cooperation in justice and home affairs.
EC Headquarters: 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049, Brussels, Belgium
President: Jacques Santer (Luxembourg)

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
Founded in 1959 to promote the individual and collective development of regional developing member countries through the financing of economic and social development projects and the provision of technicalSout-oa*[uus7qu*Tus Fus7qu*Tus non of(]*(v4cing 2ank (IDB)

aAuthoT*(o025 -d in 1959 to
Benjamin (Guinea)

22, 1945. 22 members (including the Palestinian Liberation Organization)
Headquarters: Arab League Building, Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt
Address: P.O. Box 11642, Cairo, Egypt
Secretary-General: Dr. Ahmed Esmat Abd al-Meguid (Egypt)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The Atlantic Alliance was established as a defensive political and military alliance of independent countries to provide common security for its members. It links the security of North America to that of Europe. NATO transformed its structures and policies following the

The American University, School of International Service—International Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Program, Washington, D.C. 20016; Phone: (202) 885-1622

Antioch University—The McGregor School Office of Admissions, 800 Livermore St., Yellow Springs, Ohio 45387; Phone: (513) 767-6325; Website: 192.131.123.121:125:/macr/

Australian National University—Research School of Pacific Studies, G.P.O. Box 4, Canberra, A.C.T. 2601, Australia; Phone: (61) 6-259-3098

Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution—Rochusplatz 1, A-7461 Stadtschlainin, Austria; Phone: (43) 3355-2498

Bethel College and Theological Seminary—Global Studies Program, 3900 Bethel Drive, St. Paul, Minn. 55112-6999; Phone: (612) 638-6400

Carleton University—Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), Paterson Hall, 2A55 OH, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada; Phone: (613) 788-6655

The Catholic University of America—School of Religious Studies, Washington, D.C. 20064; Phone: (202) 319-5700

Catholic University of Leuven—Center for Peace Research Department, Politieke Wetenschappen, Van Evenstraat 2B, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; Phone: (32) 16-28-32-41

Colgate University—Peace Studies Program, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, N.Y. 13346-1398; Phone: (315) 824-7806

Conrad Grebel College—Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G6, Canada; Phone: (519) 885-0220, ext. 261

Cornell University—Peace Studies Program, 130 Uris Hall, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853-7601; Phone: (607) 255-6484

Columbia University—International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, Box 53, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027; Phone: (212) 678-3289; Website: www.tc.columbia.edu/~iccr/

Earlham College—Peace and Global Studies Program,

Mount Vernon College School of Business—Communication and Policy Studies Program, 2100 Fowhall Road, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007; Phone: (202) 625-4558

Academy of Family Mediators
355 Tyrol W., 1500 S. Hwy. 100, Golden Valley, Minn. 55416; Phone: (612) 525-8670; E-mail: office@igc.apc.org
Supports professional family (especially divorce and custody) mediation and public awareness and education of family mediation services.

The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution
1800 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-5802; Phone: (202) 331-2258;
The Standing Committee acts as a resource center for citizens, attorneys, bar leaders, and judiciary and also holds workshops and assists in the introduction of alternatives to court programs. It publishes the [illegible] newsletter.

American Arbitration Association
140 W. 51st St., New York, N.Y. 10020-1203; Phone: (212) 484-4100; Thirty-five regional offices with a pool of 54,000 trained mediators/arbitrators who can assist on a wide variety of topics.

Children's Creative Response to Conflict
Box 271, Nyack, N.Y. 10960;
Phone: (914) 358-4601; E-mail: fornatl@igc.apc.org; Provides conflict resolution skills to those who work with young people. Twenty branches provide various programs including mediation, bias awareness training, and conflict resolution.

Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED)
George Mason University, 4400 University, Fairfax, Va. 22030; Phone: (202) 273-4485; E-mail: copred@igc.apc.org; COPRED is a community of educators, activists, and researchers working on alternatives to violence and war.

Council of Better Business Bureaus—ADR Division
4200 Wilson Blvd., Suite 800, Arlington, Va. 22203; Phone: (800) 334-2406;
The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Division of the BBB provides training in arbitration and mediation.

CONFLICTNET
18 De Boom St., San Francisco, Calif. 94107; Phone: (415) 442-0220;
E-mail: jrhelie@igc.apc.org; The computer network, CONFLICTNET, assists in the facilitation of information and resource exchange in conflict resolution through computer access.

Conflict Resolution Center International
2205 E. Carson St., Pittsburgh, Pa. 15203-2107; Phone: (412) 481-5559;
E-mail: crcii@igc.apc.org; A resource center that maintains an international data base of interveners, trainers, and consultants to match those needing such services with service providers.

Educators for Social Responsibility
23 Garden St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138;
Phone: (617) 492-1764; An international organization of educators who help students to understand conflict and acquire personal conflict resolution skills and social responsibility.

National Association for Community Mediation
1726 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-4502; Phone: (202) 467-6226;
Supports the maintenance and growth of community-based mediation programs and encourages the development and sharing of resources in the dispute resolution field.

National Association for Mediation in Education (NAME)
205 Hampshire UMASS, Amherst, Mass. 01003; Phone: (413) 545-2462;
E-mail: name@igc.apc.org; A national and international clearinghouse for conflict resolution information, which provides resources, technical assistance, and training.

National Institute for Dispute Resolution
1726 M St. N.W., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20036-4502; Phone: (202) 466-4764; E-mail:

Unless otherwise indicated, all www addresses begin with http://

General Information

Children and War:

DiploNet

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The Carter Center brings people and resources together to resolve conflicts; promote democracy; fight disease, hunger, and poverty; and protect and promote human rights worldwide. It is guided by the principle that people, with the necessary skills, knowledge, and access to resources, can improve their own lives and the lives of others.

Founded in 1982 by Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter in partnership with Emory University, the nonprofit Center undertakes action-oriented programs in cooperation with world leaders and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this way, the Center has touched the lives of people in at least 65 countries.

The Center's programs are directed by resident experts or fellows, some of whom teach at Emory University. They design and implement activities in cooperation with President and Mrs. Carter, networks of world leaders, other NGOs, and partners in the United States and abroad. Private donations from individuals, foundations, corporations, and multilateral development assistance programs support the Center's work.