

Myth, Reality, and the Future in Southern Africa: Challenges for a New Administration

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When one examines all the foreign policy issues likely to face the next U.S. administration, southern Africa, while inherently difficult, may be the most promising of all in terms of actually influencing positive developments and obtaining measurable results in a short time span. Current policies have begun to capitalize on a tentative movement among nations in the region to address certain situations which are prohibiting stabilization. However, with the existence of an international consensus concerning the illegality of the occupation of Namibia and the dehumanization of the policy of apartheid more could be done to advance a multilateral approach toward southern Africa. In short, a real opportunity to bring peace to a troubled region is being missed. Part of the

problem is lack of accurate information and understanding of what is happening in the region. Advocacy and passion have often clouded or distorted reality. This past March, former Governor William Milliken and I were co-chairmen of "Myth, Reality, and the Future in Southern Africa: Challenges for a New Administration," a policy briefing sponsored by The Carter Center of Emory University and the Ford Foundation. During the last two days of March at The Carter Center in Atlanta, we brought together representatives of the presidential candidates, government leaders, and experts on the region to discuss policy options of the United States toward southern Africa.

The purpose of the briefing was to examine the many facets of the situation in southern Africa and then to relay what we have learned to those who will comprise the leadership of the next U.S. administration. Rather than critiquing the Reagan administration, we looked toward the design of new policy initiatives in a non-partisan way. Our hope was to separate the myth from the reality in southern Africa and identify options for the United States which would give impetus to southern Africa's efforts to attain a peaceful future.

We conducted the briefing in five sessions in which we examined the conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, as well as the interrelationships of those countries. Discussions were focused on: how to get the South Africans and the Cubans out of Angola, what U.S. policy toward Mozambique should be, what can be done to revive Namibian negotiations, and how to encourage movement away from apartheid.

We found that all the participants shared a general abhorrence of South Africa's policies, not only of its policy of racial oppression by a minority white government, apartheid, but also of its policies toward the neighboring states which adversely affect the peace and the stability of the whole region.

Participants also agreed that in the last few years, progress on resolving these crucial issues has been delayed somewhat both by the Reagan administration and the administration of Mrs. Thatcher. The United States and Great Britain have shown a recalcitrance to join with other nations and, in particular, the United Nations Security Council, to take action to let South Africa know that its continued apartheid policies and its bloody cross-border strikes would not be condoned.

Jimmy Carter

Since our briefing in March, we have seen progress made toward the resolution of some of these conflicts in southern Africa. South African troops are being withdrawn from Angola, and negotiations

political party, their campaigns must have the benefit of the latest thinking on one of the most volatile regions in the world.

It is critical for citizens of southern Africa that a state of emergency has been in existence in South Africa for over two years which has suspended the civil rights of a vast majority of the population of that country; that Namibia is still under the thumb of South Africa, clearly in violation of international law; that Angola is embroiled in a military battle with its neighbors; and that Mozambique is almost totally devastated by a guerrilla movement funded and fueled by South Africa. These situations demand an active and concerned policy on the part of the United States, a policy that should not be contingent upon which political party is represented in the executive office of this nation in January. Indeed, I would like to think that the critical conditions in southern Africa require us to transcend party politics. We did just that at The Carter Center briefing as government officials, officials of international organizations, scholars, regional experts, and representatives of the presidential candidates pooled their various resources and formulated a set of U.S. policy options whose common goal is to facilitate the

Conference Summary

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Southern Africa is a volatile region afflicted by harsh legacies of colonial and racial domination. By means of a system of imposed racial and ethnic separatism known as *apartheid*, South Africa's white minority (five million) has prolonged its ascendancy over a voteless black majority (28 million). Since 1984, the government has had recourse to repeatedly renewed "states of emergency." South Africa's control over Namibia, despite United Nations action (1966) terminating its League of Nations mandate, and its support of rebel movements in the two largely undeveloped and illiterate former Portuguese colonies, Angola and Mozambique, injected the *apartheid* issue into regional conflict and prompted opportunistic Cuban and Soviet intervention.

Given these circumstances, conference discussion focused on how best to realize several widely endorsed policy goals set forth by President Carter. These goals are to:

- ! bring an end to the *apartheid* system with the least possible amount of violence;
- ! obtain the withdrawal of Cuban and South African forces from Angola;
- ! facilitate an end to Angola's internal conflict;
- ! realize Namibian independence under UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);
- ! reduce the negative impact of South African policies on neighboring front-line states; and
- ! strengthen the independence and internal stability of those states.

South African *apartheid* lies at the core of regional instability. Some policy analysts have perceived the United States choice as limited to either tacit support for the *apartheid* order or acceptance of Communist gains in the region.

However, an apparent Soviet shift away from costly expansionism (viz. Afghanistan) is adding weight to the view that a principled U.S. strategy to promote political freedom and equality in South Africa and the surrounding region constitutes a viable hope for reducing violence and external intervention. Though American strategic interests in the region are not considered vital, over the past four years *apartheid*-related political and moral considerations have led to intensified domestic pressure for a more dynamic American policy. An understanding of the limits and possibilities of American influence in a region of troubled change will be critical to the fashioning of a policy that is maximally effective but does not promise more than it can deliver.

South Africa

More than a decade of repeatedly suppressed yet persistent resistance that began with the Soweto uprising of 1976 has brought a grudgingly reformative South African government to accept that it must find ways to incorporate blacks into economic and political structures of the country. However, the mode, pace, and extent of this incorporation, or cooptation, has remained under the constrictive control of a Nationalist party government unable to persuade credible black leadership to endou2oepeaernment u.002& inc4ext20 0 12 9mdie.3 14.235 0(thatocic ntro th

proved vulnerable to external trade sanctions and related loss in financial confidence. Over the past decade, South Africa's population has grown at a faster rate than its economy (a 1.3% versus 3.6% differential according to some estimates). Unemployment within the economically active black population has reached 30 to 40% and is expected to climb to 50 or 60% within 15 years unless there is a fundamental change in the economy. Since the Soweto uprising, South Africa has been a net exporter of capital unable to attract financial and technological investments crucial to economic growth.

Also hampering the infusion of substantial resources into a cooptation strategy has been the militant reaction of Afrikaners fearful of the consequences of the government's haphazard, albeit modest, moves to reduce racial discrimination and compartmentalization. Recent displacement of the liberal Progressive Federal Party by the right wing Conservative Party as the official parliamentary opposition and the emergence of a paramilitary Afrikaner Resistance Movement seeking a return to "pure" Verwoerdian *apartheid* has slowed reform. A xenophobic expression of Afrikaner nationalism, the extreme right threatens to capitalize electorally on government moves to "sell out" to external pressure, notably on Namibia.

By mid-1988 it was evident that the South African government faced deteriorating options. It could not hope to mount and sustain a substantial program of internal development while continuing to expend vast sums administering and defending Namibia (over a billion dollars annually), dispatching expeditionary forces, sustaining surrogate armies (e.g. 32nd Battalion), and mounting "preemptive strikes" against alleged ANC facilities in neighboring states - its strategy of regional destabilization. That South Africa had overstretched the limits of its power was confirmed by its August 1988 military withdrawal from Angola.

Angola

Decimated by over a quarter century of anti-colonial and internal conflict, Angola is rich in natural resources - oil, diamonds, arable land. Installed in 1975 with the support of Cuban troops and Soviet arms

air supremacy over southwestern Angola and even overflowed South African military bases inside Namibia.

This military reversal, and the fortuitous conjuncture of a basic change in Soviet policy, made a resumption of U.S. brokered peace negotiations possible. The Soviet Union's preoccupation with internal reconstruction under reformist Mikhail Gorbachev reduced Moscow's tolerance, let alone enthusiasm, for costly military entanglement in distant southwest Africa. Encouraged by the Soviets, upon whom both were dependent for material and finance, Angola and Cuba agreed to a ceasefire that permitted the orderly withdrawal of South African forces from Angola. Negotiations then centered on a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and South African forces from Namibia, respectively. It left unaddressed the continuing war between UNITA insurgents and the Luanda government.

Namibia

Under South African administration since the end of World War I, Namibia, with its heavily militarized Caprivi Strip reaching into the center of southern Africa, has been viewed as a vital buffer zone by the South African military and as a crucial extension of white political power by Afrikaner nationalists. South African forces repeatedly destroyed guerrilla units of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) attempting to infiltrate from Angola and made half-hearted efforts to build up a "moderate" political alternative to SWAPO inside Namibia. But South Africa's failure to devolve genuine authority on local black leadership insured that an internationally supervised election would result in an electoral victory for SWAPO.

By late 1988, however, the cost-benefit equation in Namibia was changing. If it refused to implement UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), South Africa

border would translate into increased support for SWAPO and military encounters with Angolan and Cuban air and ground forces. If it did implement 435, continued control of the crucial rail head and port of Walvis Bay (a legally held enclave) would still leave South Africa in a position to intervene quickly to thwart the eventuality of any threat from Namibian territory while releasing it from the military and economic burdens of direct rule.

An obstacle to such a rational solution remained Nationalist concern for the impact of such a pullback on volatile domestic politics, white and black. While agreement on terms, and actual implementation of a mutual Cuban and South African troop withdrawal remained problematic, a gradual regional retrenchment by an overextended South Africa seemed under way.

Mozambique

Recent South African initiatives - to revive the Nkomati Accord (1984) with pledges to discontinue any residual support for the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents and to provide technical and security assistance to permit the transmission of electrical power from the Cabora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River to South Africa - provide further evidence of at least a short term move away from an aggressive destabilization policy. Originally organized and financed from outside, RENAMO lacks political cohesion and identity but has been brutally effective as a military force that holds sway over large areas of Mozambique's countryside. A successful meeting between President P.W. Botha and Joaquim Chissano at Cabora Bassa in September would seem to have undercut lingering pressure from U.S. conservatives to provide assistance to an "anticommunist" RENAMO that a U.S. Department of State report recently held responsible for vast destruction and the deaths of some 100,000 civilians. Even with the assist of thousands of troops from Zimbabwe and Tanzania, however, the military situation remains desperate. Economic reconstruction in Mozambique and the pace of economic development

in neighboring Zimbabwe are held hostage to continuing RENAMO-fomented violence and chaos. Facing up to grim security and economic realities, Chissano's Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government has moved steadily away from an earlier doctrinaire Marxism and seeks stronger ties with western countries.

OPTIONS

Given the volatile and changing circumstances of southern Africa, the next American administration will face complex issues demanding clear overall strategy and active international collaboration. The engaged and determined leadership of the President will be crucial to the realization of United States policy goals. Recognizing the underlying centrality of racial injustice to the totality of southern African issues, the President will need to address the basic long term goal of bringing an end to *apartheid* in South Africa with minimal violence along with other more immediately achievable regional goals discussed at The Carter Center conference on southern Africa.

South Africa

A retrenched, determined South Africa may be stubbornly resistant to external pressure for fundamental change. For that tormented country this may mean increasing isolation and decay. But chances for positive change may be improved by combining international pressure with educational and other empowerment programs for black South Africans. All future proposals for sanctions should be considered for their potential effectiveness, not for reasons

would lead to the abolition of international constraints and resumption of fruitful economic relations.

Foreign forces in Angola

In order to avoid any discontinuity or lost opportunity, the President elect should endorse the current negotiating process concerning Angola and Namibia. Should those negotiations collapse, however, a new administration might turn to the United Nations Security Council, a revised "contact group," or some other multilateral approach that could add weight and provide continuity to the diplomatic quest for peaceful solutions to the inter-linked Angolan and Namibian d pe3M0l6ts sflutions to the inter-linkeo the inter5olan agul ag Angolaendors by pledgthostodha6

for economic development as well as by U.S. undertakings to help insure the impartiality of United Nations supervised elections.

A Regional Overview

Andrew Young

to lay aside a history of betrayal and distrust and sit confidently at a table with the United States and Great Britain to draft a constitution.

Finally, we must realize that the identity of various groups and factions in southern Africa are often blurred and distorted for political purposes and that we need to clearly understand the backgrounds, perspectives, and initiatives of these groups if we are to deal with each one effectively. For example, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), a group that the Reagan administration defines as the so-called liberation movement in Mozambique, really is not even Mozambican. RENAMO is an organization of those blacks who fought for the Rhodesian Front with Ian Smith and were afraid to stay in an independent Zimbabwe at the end of the war. All of us involved in negotiating a peaceful resolution to the civil war in Zimbabwe - the United States, Great Britain, and the United Nations - must accept some blame for the handling of these individuals. As blacks helping to support a minority white government, they are understandably afraid to stay in an independent Zimbabwe. They asked for passage to Britain and were denied it; they didn't know where to go. The South Africans eventually took them in, trained them, and dropped them back into Mozambique. They have little or no political or ethnic or geographic connection with the Mozambican situation. Similarl

two million people who are white. I say only two million people because I don't think the majority of white South Africans approve of the strategy that is going on in southern Africa today. The cultural division between Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites, the political divisions, the dominance of the Nationalist party and of the conservative wing of that party, create a kind of political dynamic that makes it virtually impossible for democracy to rule, even among whites. Even the majority of whites do not have an opportunity to make a decision about what is good for whites in South Africa. You really have a population in which a white minority is controlling the white majority; and that white minority, then, is developing the policies that are enslaving and frustrating the growth and development of perhaps as many as two hundred million people. It is not a matter of black and white.

Zimbabwe is a multi-racial country, and people, black and white, who were at war ten years ago are now at peace and are friends with each other.

The security guards that they assigned to me when I was in Zimbabwe last were a black and a white police officer; one who fought with Ian Smith and the other who fought with Robert Mugabe. They were now riding around in the same police car laughing and joking about one another's children. Yet, if they had met ten years ago, one would have had to kill the other. There seems to be no animosity. The business community in Zimbabwe is thriving in a free-market economy in spite of drought, in spite of all the harassment of South Africa, in spite of the fact that there has been little or no infusion of capital and investment from the West - as we promised at the time of independence.

What South Africa has attempted to do is to make the entire southern part of the continent dependent on South Africa. That is not too hard to do, because you have geographic areas that are huge with populations which are very small. Botswana is larger than Texas with about one million people. They can't possibly

patrol those borders. Angola is twice the size of California with about 14 million people, so border patrol there is also difficult. We cannot, with all of our armed forces, patrol our border between Mexico and the United States. We cannot stop drugs from coming in from the Caribbean. We can't even keep immigrants from coming to our shores from Haiti. There is simply no way for African states to protect all of the geography with very small military organizations and very small populations. What you have is a pattern of hit-and-run raids maneuvered by the South Africans that are designed to break the railroad connections.

The old colonial railroad connections passed through the copper and gold mines in the central part of southern Africa to the sea. One went through the Beira Corridor from Zambia and Zimbabwe through Mozambique. Another, the Benguela Railroad, went from Zambia across to Angola. These are railroads that literally cross thousands of miles of barren land. It is no problem at all for a helicopter to fly a few rebels in, blow up a few miles of track, and fly out. It is also no problem for people to come in with helicopter gun ships and machine gun a village and then plant mines along the road, so that for months afterwards people walking or driving are blown up haphazardly. That is the kind of war that is being waged by two million white South Africans against two hundred million people, black and white, in southern Africa. In Botswana, that kind of engagement or aggression is not just against that country's black population. Botswana has a very successful business community that is white, and that coexists and works along with the predominantly black government; it is a very successful multi-racial society. The same is true of almost every one of these southern African countries.

The role, I think, of the next administration is simply to give these two million people a face-saving way out. I put the emphasis on face-saving, because what we demonstrated successfully in the transformation of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe is that it is possible to put together a constitution that grants rights to the majority

while at the same time protecting the rights of the minority. That can be done constitutionally; it can be done with all the diversity of ethnicity and language that exists in southern Africa. The truth of it is the ethnic divisions in southern Africa are no more complicated than the ethnic divisions in Nigeria. For instance, if Nigeria can write a constitution that essentially protects the rights of people in every region, and guarantees them an opportunity to serve in government, an opportunity to be a part of a bureaucracy, a similar kind of constitution, I think, could be constructed for South Africa. What Nigeria has done is take our affirmative action model and make it a national policy.

The only hitch to using a similar process in South Africa is that the only person who could ensure its success is Nelson Mandela. I don't think there is anybody in

as in what was then the Gulf Oil area, Kabinda. The solution to this situation is not all that difficult.

I have been reluctant to advocate total sanctions against South Africa, mainly because I don't think they can be enforced. Total sanctions actually made Rhodesia's economy stronger. I think there are selective sanctions which can be enforced that will be sufficient to bring about the changes that are necessary. In that kind of geography, an oil embargo, for instance, is virtually impossible. There are some African countries, embarrassingly so, who are even still supplying oil to South Africa because there is no way to stop them. We know that ships that leave African ports end up turning to the south rather than turning to the north with their cargoes of oil. Because of the difficulty of monitoring all maritime traffic in the area, a naval blockade is simply unenforceable.

An airline embargo is enforceable and it would put no pressure on the poor. It would basically make the middle class, upper middle class, and business community share whatever suffering was necessary. It wouldn't destroy the economy and it wouldn't create the kind of import-substitution that works't destroy the é

take the initiative in Zimbabwe. I always had the feeling that the full resources of the United States government were on the side of democracy and that it was possible with that power, and with that pressure, to bring about an independent Zimbabwe. I think it will still be possible, with the pressure of the United States, and with the active commitment of the next president, whether Democrat or Republican, to do the same thing. If not, there will be a continuing deterioration of the region that, if it lasts longer than the life of Nelson Mandela, will make it extremely more difficult to bring about total peace in the region, which I think is still possible.

A Regional Overview

S. T. Ketlogetswe

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Washington, D.C.

Introduction

It is fortuitous that this briefing takes place after meetings of two major regional forums: the Southern African Development Coordination Conference annual consultative conference in Arusha on January 28-29, 1988; and the summit of the front-line states in Lusaka on March 24, 1988. I have benefited from their insights and it is my hope that I shall be able to share this with you during the next two days.

To set the tone of my remarks on the political developments in the region, let me quote briefly from the summit communique:

"The leaders vehemently condemned South Africa's ever-increasing internal repression and brutality in the perpetuation of the apartheid system, its continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its acts of aggression, subversion, destabilization and state

terrorism against front-line states, particularly Angola and Mozambique."

General Political Situation

South Africa

The root cause of the political and security problems besetting the region today is the racist policy of *apartheid* in South Africa. The failure by the Republic of South Africa (RSA) to abolish *apartheid* has led to the current escalation of repression within South Africa itself and the heightening of tension in the region as a whole. Tragically, RSA has found succor and comfort in those who espouse the view that southern Africa is about to be engulfed by a communist onslaught. South African military adventurism into Angola

wrong groups. South Africa has during the last few years put pressure on its neighbors to enter into a Nkomati type of accord. As everybody knows, the neighboring countries are no threat to RSA. Internally, RSA has imprisoned all the real leaders of the black majority and sought to hold negotiations with those of its own choosing. This of course has the effect of prolonging the stalemate indefinitely.

The United States policy toward South Africa has in part compounded the problems of the region. Firstly, because it has not lived up to its original objective of encouraging RSA to move toward a more just and equitable political accommodation with its black majority. Secondly, it has always been conceived in narrow ideological terms. Thirdly, it has at best been ad hoc and lacked a comprehensive thrust that enabled the other countries to know how to respond to the U.S. policy initiatives. Fourthly, with regard to RSA, it lacked an incentive structure and, as a consequence, its architects and implementors ended up, in the words of Professor Rotberg, "with the carrot but no stick."

The situation in South Africa is not likely to improve unless the United States and the rest of the international community face reality. The problems of southern Africa are not a function of East-West relations. There is no communist onslaught poised to engulf the region. Nor are the exiled nationalist elements hell bent on turning the country into a marxist dictatorship. Those who are so inclined are

mainly to punish Mozambique for supporting the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU). The United States is supporting UNITA because the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which it supported, was defeated by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The Cubans would never have come to Angola if South Africa had not invaded Angola in 1975. As we are all aware, Dr. Crocker and the Angolans are talking again; at the same time the U.S. Stinger missiles continue to flow toward UNITA. Our view is that no amount of shuttle diplomacy can serve as an escape from reality. If indeed the U.S. wants the Cubans to leave Angola, it must put pressure on RSA to withdraw its forces first.

Mozambique

In Mozambique, South Africa-sponsored bandit activity has exacerbated the already shaky economic situation. This has led to the disruption of rural life and agricultural production, causing famine. Over five million people, over a third of the population, have been affected by the insurgency and drought. More than 100,000 people have died and an estimated 3.8 million people face starvation. In a move calculated to perpetuate the dependence of the region on itself, RSA has concentrated the brunt of its aggression on the coastal states of Angola and Mozambique. The familiar rationale that RENAMO is fighting an economic onslaught has been used to prolong a phony war of carnage whose cost in human terms has been most severe.

Namibia

The progress to independence under United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 has assumed the status of a permanent stalemate. The illegality of RSA occupation of Namibia has ceased to trouble the conscience of the West. Namibia has been relegated to the back burner; it has become an issue of incidental concern, of nuisance value.

During 1987 there was a flurry of activity. The Council for Namibia met in Angola in May in an attempt to keep the Namibian issue alive. In October, foreign ministers of countries that constitute the membership of the Council for Namibia met in New York and called for action under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter if by 1988 South Africa had still not heeded Resolution 435 (1978). In December, the UN Secretary-General sent a team to Angola to determine whether RSA had withdrawn its troops from Namibia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 602 of 1982.

In November 1985, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and the internal parties accepted a proportional representation electoral system, an event that should have triggered the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). However, it was only in October 1987 that the Security Council was able to adopt Resolution 601, theoretically to trigger the implementation of Res. 435 (1978). The reason Resolution 601 (1987) was adopted two years in arrears was because the United States had resisted the convening of the Security Council under the pretext that there were still outstanding issues that remained to be solved. Following the sending of the U.S. government's fact-finding team to Angola, the Security Council passed, in December, Resolution 602 (1987), which gave South Africa two weeks to withdraw its troops from Angola pursuant to Security Council Resolution 602 of 1982.

The general view is that these resolutions will remain a dead letter. Our view is that South Africa has been encouraged by "constructive engagement," and the more the West continues to sweet-talk South Africa, the more violent and defiant she becomes. The linkage issue, which has been unanimously rejected, provides an opening for RSA to renege on its commitment to the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978).

SADCC and the Regional Economic Outlook

deteriorating debt-service ratios unless there is substantial increase in ODA flows.

Average GDP growth for 1986 was estimated at 2.5% and for 1987 at 2.4%. Naturally, these average figures hide disparities in the economic performance of individual member states. Most economies have either stagnated or experienced negative growth rates. Only Botswana and Swaziland recorded appreciable real growth of 12% and 9% respectively.

The existence of the grouping of the majority-ruled states in southern Africa, whether in their political role as the front-line states or in their collective self-reliance venture as SADCC, should be seen as a force for peace and stability in the region. It provides a forum for consultation among member states as well as between SADCC and cooperating partners on issues of mutual interest and concern. Furthermore, since the majority of them cannot give meaningful development on their own, collective self-reliance is the only viable option.

unfold in South Africa. At risk are the lives of thousands, possibly millions, of South Africans, black and white, the future political and economic viability of the entire southern third of the African continent, and history's judgment of the United States."

In the light of the challenge, what steps should the next U.S. administration take?

The following, though not exhaustive, provide a basis for a response to the challenge.

- ! De-link the independence of Namibia from the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This linkage is an extraneous issue to which the people of Namibia should not be held hostage.

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The Potential U.S. Role in Bringing About Political Change in South Africa

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Events in South Africa in the last two months once again have drawn the world's attention to the seemingly intractable social and political crises in that country. Pretoria's decision to ban 17 anti-*apartheid* groups and 18 prominent black anti-*apartheid* activists seems to cry out for a response from the West that will bring the South African government to its senses and to the political bargaining table. Thus, the ongoing debate over what the United States and other western powers should do to eliminate *apartheid* receives fresh impetus, and arguments over the types, quantities, and timing of sanctions are once again the order of the day. The debate is an important one and it would indeed be disappointing if the West simply chose to ignore the institutionalized injustices of South Africa. But too often it has been reduced to a simple question of whether or not one supports a specific policy - "Do you support disinvestment? Are you in favor of trade sanctions?" Frequently the debate then moves on to whether the policy option selected can be effectively carried out and what the economic impact on South Africa is likely to be.

The second question asks how political change is likely to come to South Africa given the realities of that country. If one concludes that political change is only likely to come through revolutionary violence, this would lead one to select a set of policy options quite different from those based on a conclusion that political change in South Africa is most likely to be achieved through negotiation and compromise.

The third question concerns the present economic and political realities of South Africa.

United States Objectives in South Africa

As mentioned above, U.S. objectives can be both reactive - South African legislation and policies we wish to see repealed - and proactive - developments the United States would seek to encourage in South Africa.

Among the reactive objectives would be:

- ! Ending the state of emergency and releasing detainees.
- ! Releasing political prisoners and unbanning the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).
- ! Lifting the banning orders on other individuals and organizations inside South Africa.
- ! Eliminating all remaining forms of petty *apartheid*; e.g. segregation of public facilities, restrictions on black businesses trading in the central cities.
- ! Ending residential and educational segregation.
- ! Stopping the creation of any additional independent homelands and reincorporating the existing four independent homelands into South Africa.
- ! Ending the system of racial classification by the state with the repeal of the Population Registration Act.

There is a high degree of consensus over these reactive objectives both within the United States and the 85% of the South African population that is black.

Consensus begins to break down when one begins to consider proactive objectives. These objectives fall into two roughly antithetical clusters. The first embodies liberal democratic and capitalist economic values. The second

emphasizes central government guidance and control of political and economic activities within the country.

Included among the liberal democratic and capitalist objectives would be:

- ! Legal safeguards for individual rights.
- ! An independent judiciary.
- ! An acceptance of multiparty democracy and political pluralism.
- ! Transitional political structures that could offer some protection to minority groups from oppression by the majority.
- ! An economic system that provides for individual property ownership and rewards individual initiative. It could also have redistributive features such as increased spending on social welfare and the purchase of white-owned farms by the state and their division among black rural residents.

The second cluster of objectives would include:

- ! The need for a strong central government whose interests at times would take precedence over political pluralism and individual rights.
- ! Straightforward majority rule with no political structures guaranteeing minority groups political power in excess of their numerical weight in the voting population.
- ! State ownership of the mining companies, banks, major manufacturing firms, transportation networks, and utilities.
- ! Significant land redistribution and rapid redistribution of income.

While nearly all Americans and white South Africans would support the liberal democratic set of objectives over the second set, there is substantial support among black South Africans for the latter.

These differences of vision over the outline of a post-*apartheid* South Africa obviously complicate American relations with black South Africans.

A final set of possible United States policy objectives are related to the level and types of violence now extant in South Africa. Simply saying that the United States opposes all violence in South Africa or that we wish for change to come with the least amount of violence possible avoids examining the possibility that some

forms of violence may be more susceptible to U.S. policy initiatives than others.
Currently, South Africa is the scene of:

South African Realities

Since declaring the debt moratorium, South Africa has successfully negotiated a repayment schedule that will see 18 percent of the \$14 billion in foreign loans repaid by mid-1990.

- ! *The unemployment rate among black South Africans is already high and will go still higher.* Although accurate figures are not available, various estimates show unemployment among blacks to be on the order of 30-40% and for whites between 5 and 8%. Researchers note that nearly 4 million blacks will enter the labor force between now and the year 2000 and there is no sign that anywhere near that number of jobs will be created. As a result, it is frequently estimated that 50% of the black economically-active population will be unemployed 15 years from now barring some dramatic change in the economy.

! *The South African government has managed to severely disrupt groups opposed to its rule and is actively seeking to impl*

township councilors would then participate in selecting representatives to the previously discussed national council.

- ! *The South African business community is not a potent lobbying force for political change.* Although progressive elements of the business community mounted a successful effort to liberalize restrictions on black labor, they have neither the will nor the ability to achieve a lifting of *apartheid's* restrictions on the political rights of blacks. The business community is strongly opposed to the anti-capitalist positions taken by many government opponents and is quite frankly pessimistic over what life for whites would be like under a black majority government.

Even if they had the will, the ruling National Party has made it clear that it will not tolerate businessmen "meddling" in politics. Its sharp attack on

- ! *The South African government has the capacity, will, and wit to reduce the impact of punitive economic sanctions.* South Africa's exports of gold, diamonds, and platinum account for nearly 60% of her export earnings and are effectively immune from trade sanctions unless the West blockades all sea, land, and air traffic leaving South Africa. With the earnings from these exports, South Africa would then be able to purchase, albeit at inflated black market prices, essential machinery, and chemical imports it required to keep its economy going.

Because South Africa has no domestic petroleum reserves, an oil embargo often is seen as the best way

Because of the extreme sensitivity of both the South African government and its black opponents to being seen as a "puppet" of the West, the quid pro quo features of our policies would have to be downplayed.

Reviving Namibian Negotiations

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Introduction

It is remarkable how developments in southern Africa in recent months have placed the question of Namibia on the back burner. Obviously, the issue has not been neglected, but the urgency and high priority given to it in the period 1978-1980 is no longer evident. Following the submission of the *Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation* by the Western Five or Contact Group and the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 435 (1978), there were euphoric expectations that Namibia would attain its independence before Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. The latter has long since obtained its independence while the clouds still remain dark over the emergence of Namibia to independent statehood.

The United Nations Council for Namibia, the African states of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) are using their best efforts to keep alive the struggle for Namibian independence. However, the measures they have sponsored or proposed, as well as the actions they have taken, have not yet removed successfully the outstanding obstacles to full implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). Instead of brightening the prospect for an early agreement on the independence of Namibia, other developments and positions, such as the linkage

issue, have brought about an impasse in the efforts to bring to fruition the negotiations over Namibian independence.

Time and time again, the international has witnessed widespread speculation that we are on the verge of a final and successful agreement on Namibia, only to have such hopes quickly dashed and to await the next round of optimistic speculations. Why has the Namibian situation become so seemingly intractable? The predominant view is that South Africa has not yet reached a firm decision to grant independence to Namibia in the context of internationally approved arrangements. However, there are those who would argue that, for South Africa, the strategic, political, and psychological factors are real and that, therefore, the presence of large numbers of Cuban troops in Angola should not be ignored. In

category from the issue of the "illegal regime" in the Republic of South Africa. While there might be some who would argue that the denial of majority rule in South Africa does not necessarily constitute an illegal regime, there is little or no room to argue that South Africa's administration in Namibia is anything but illegal. The ruling of the International Court of Justice and numerous resolutions of the United Nations have firmly established this point.

It is, of course, proper to wonder about the legal implication of the negotiations with South Africa regarding the Proposal for a Settlement on the Namibian Situation. Does South Africa now have some legal standing in Namibia until such time as Resolution 435 (1978) can be fully implemented? As is well-known, South Africa has never accepted that its rule in Namibia is illegal. In fact, it continues to act as if it were the legitimate constitutional authority on the territory. It is of some interest to observe, however, that the United Nations has frequently impressed upon South Africa that it would aggravate its illegal rule in Namibia if it should abandon the settlement proposal of 1978 by turning over the government of Namibia to the "internal parties." In this connection, the General Assembly strongly condemned South Africa for the imposition of the so-called interim government in Namibia on June 17, 1985.

In the jurisprudence of the United Nations, the legal position is clear. Despite the negotiations with South Africa on the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978), the administration of South Africa in Namibia is still illegal. The negotiations with South Africa have their rationale inasmuch as they seek to bring a situation of illegality to an end. The United Nations Council for Namibia remains the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until such time as the people of the territory can assume full responsibility for their own well-being. The practical consideration of how the Council would exercise its responsibility inside Namibia was what warranted the negotiations between the Western Five and South Africa which led to the "Proposals".

In further assessing the implications of the failure to implement Resolution 435 (1978), it should be recalled that the Western Five undertook the responsibility of negotiating with South Africa with a view to demonstrating to the African states

Any exercise to determine new policy options for Namibia ought to see clearly some other implications of the failure to implement Resolution 435 (1978). In the search for accommodation in southern Africa, the African states and the liberation movements have been urged to place greater reliance on negotiations rather than on "armed struggle." As was noted previously, in spite of the African states' embrace of negotiations, Namibia still remains under illegal administration. For SWAPO the lesson is a bitter one. It may therefore be justified in arguing that only a concentration on "armed struggle" could bring about the independence of Namibia. African States in Lusaka in April 196

One would have thought that those states that continue to reject "armed struggle" as the means to end the illegal regime in Namibia would have spared no efforts to ensure complete success of the negotiating track. Had this been the case, then it could have been held up to the black people of South Africa as the preferred means to end the system of *apartheid*

surprised that the African states now insist that only comprehensive mandatory sanctions can bring about meaningful change, if anything can, in South Africa's position?

During the period of high optimism about prospects for Namibian independence, there was a feeling that South African policy makers were fully conscious of the demonstration effect of a solution in Namibia. There was the suggestion that South Africa indeed wished a negotiated solution in Namibia to prove that the negotiating process is a preferred option for southern Africa. An internationally acceptable solution in Namibia was supposed to relax the pressure on South Africa regarding *apartheid*, thereby providing a breathing space for a negotiating option to make arrangements for a pluralistic society in South Africa.

Did South Africa, in terms of this analysis, turn away from this prospect because it discerned a lack of will, on the part of the international community, to push through the settlement in Namibia? Those who believed that South Africa was serious when it accepted the Western Five's proposals would say that South Africa had a change of heart when at least two developments occurred. One was the victory of President Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the other was the emergence of a new administration in the United States. Whatever the truth of these assumptions, the fact is that South Africa remains comfortably in Namibia and is showing every indication that it intends to stay there for a long time.

Remove the Linkage Issue

A position being put forward in this paper is that any policy review must, of necessity, examine the above implications of the failure to stay the course in the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). Such a review may warrant a renewed determination to fully implement the resolution, which still commands the broadest basis for an internationally acceptable settlement on Namibia. Needless to say, it would be absolutely necessary to de-link the solution of the Angola

Union for the Total Independence of Angola) card to further complicate matters. Rather than play into South Africa's hand, the international community should stress more the illegal nature of South African administration in Namibia and devise policy options to deal with it. Most recently, the Security Council, in its resolution 601 of October 1987, reaffirmed the illegal nature of South African administration in Namibia.

New Directions in Namibia

A new policy in Namibia, apart from removing the linkage, may demand redoubled efforts to implement Resolution 435 (1978). With a view to tackling the delaying tactics of South Africa, a specific deadline should be established for the introduction of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. If South Africa fails to meet this deadline, the Security Council should initially adopt two limited measures: (1) selective economic sanctions particularly related to Namibia and (2) international assistance to SWAPO. It is acknowledged that the African states would prefer comprehensive mandatory sanctions. But we are also conscious of the refusal of key members of the Security Council to go along with such measures under present circumstances. Perhaps, in this instance, a show of international solidarity and determination may be more important.

Considerable efforts should be made to target principally economic assets closely linked with the territory of Namibia. Even though the government of South Africa might attempt to conceal it, there should be a total ban of all imports from Namibia. It would also be necessary for all the members of the United Nations to restrict to the barest minimum all contacts with the territory. In this regard a travel ban to the territory for purposes of tourism should be considered.

In the present circumstances, SWAPO receives some modest international support. The United Nations, relying on its acceptance of SWAPO as the sole

legitimate representative of the Namibian people, defrays expenses of the SWAPO office in New York as well as covers the travel expenses of SWAPO representatives invited to the United Nations in New York or outside of United Nations headquarters. Such meetings would deal with matters of interest to the liberation struggle of the Namibian people. The estimated cost for such purposes during 1988 amounts to \$572,800.

It is pertinent to observe that for the United States government, this United Nations support has presented it with some difficulties. In accordance with Section 527 of Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programmes Appropriation Act, 1988, the U.S. government is barred from making any payments to the United Nations for SWAPO and other organizations or states listed in the act. Accordingly, the United States has consistently informed the United Nations that it would withhold proportionally any payments for SWAPO. The matter of international support for armed struggle may also be problematical. The issue could even become highly controversial if the assistance should include lethal support. There are a number of member states that hold the strong view that the United Nations, by its Charter, should not be in the business of supporting armed struggle. But account must be taken of the unique circumstance of Namibia, particularly by very broad consensus that South Africa's administration in Namibia is illegal. It is also a fact that the refusal to support "armed struggle" is not absolute. Even those who, in the Security Council, opposed armed struggle in the case of SWAPO, ANC, PAC or PLO find no difficulty in supporting armed struggle of their own choosing. But, apart from the matter of lethal support to SWAPO, a more robust international support for SWAPO may have a significant impact on South Africa's attitude.

The measures suggested above may not be sufficient to produce the desired results. Should this turn out to be the case, then the international community should be obliged to consider seriously more measures to enforce its will so as to

bring about a change in South Africa's policy in Namibia. To further demonstrate their determination for Namibia's independence, governments should decide to reduce whatever diplomatic representation they have in South Africa until such time that South Africa cooperates in the full implementation of the United Nations Plan.

No Need to Reopen Negotiations on UN Implementation Plan

Because of the broad international consensus on what is required to bring Namibia to independence, there appears to be no valid reason to reopen negotiations on the content of the United Nations Implementation Plan. Perhaps, with the passage of time, there might be a tendency to forget or ignore the agreements already reached in negotiations. Following the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa in August 1983, "...all legitimate problems" standing in the way of the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) were removed (S/18767). In his report to the Security Council in May 1987, the Secretary-General stated that the parties had agreed that "all outstanding issues relevant to the United Nations plan had been resolved." In the same report, he confirmed that agreement had been reached on the system of proportional representation for elections envisaged in Res. 435 (1978). How the system of proportional representation would work in practice would be elaborated by the Secretary-General's special representative and the South African Administrator-General, once the implementation of the UN Plan had commenced (S/18767 of March 31, 1987). The Security Council, by its Resolution 601 of October 30, 1987, authorized the Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a ceasefire between South Africa and SWAPO in order to undertake administrative and other practical steps necessary for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia. Technical arrangements relating to a cease-fire were negotiated in 1979-1980 with the government of South Africa, as well as representatives of SWAPO, and the front-line states. As a result of these talks, agreement was reached on the modalities for a cease-fire once all outstanding issues had been resolved. The only requirement remaining is

agreement on a date for the commencement of the cease-fire. There exists an understanding as to how the exchange of letters on a cease-fire could be made in view of South Africa's reluctance to sign a cease-fire agreement with SWAPO. Agreement and understandings have also been reached on other aspects of the Namibian problem. There is no longer any difficulty with the size and composition

Nevertheless, it could be possible to work out arrangements to meet some of the concerns of South Africa. For instance, while still opposing *apartheid*, Namibia could enter into a nonaggression pact with South Africa. An elected Namibian government could also give an undertaking to observe strict nonalignment with the pledge that it would not permit foreign military bases on its territory. In turn, South Africa should undertake to respect the independence of the territory and to

United Nations system. The international community cannot enjoy stability if it readily accepts or condones situations where a recognized illegality continues.

Note *: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position of the United Nations Secretariat.

Civil War and Superpower Confrontation in Angola: The Search for a Way Out

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More than two decades of anti-colonial insurgency, civil war, and external intervention have rendered Angola a symbol of man's capacity for inhumanity.

Since acceding to independence in 1975 amidst the chaos of collapsed

In recent months, a flurry of diplomatic activity has suggested to some that

effective support of UNITA insurgency that rendered an insecure Angolan government more dependent on those very Cuban forces, United States policy helped to alter political/military realities. Namibian nationalists of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) operating from Angolan sanctuaries were obliged to help the MPLA combat UNITA insurgency and resist South African incursions into Angola, effectively eliminating SWAPO's capacity to challenge South African authority within Namibia. With an assist from Israeli military technology (e.g. electronic devices to thwart Soviet air defense missiles), ⁵ South African forces acting in tandem with UNITA established control over great swaths of lightly populated south and southeastern Angola.

Thus, when Chester Crocker, United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, recently managed to convince the Angolan government to declare what it had always implicitly accepted, the principle of total Cuban withdrawal, and to agree to a speedier than previously proposed timetable for such withdrawal in return for reciprocal South African withdrawal from Namibia, the South African government pointed to changed realities. In the words of a sympathetic journalist, "the South African army [had] changed the military equation." The most that a Cuban withdrawal could produce at this point might be a South African withdrawal from Angola, not Namibia. ⁶

This new "military equation" achieved with American assistance, combined with South African anger over economic sanctions imposed under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, led State President P.W. Botha publicly to belittle American diplomacy and praise the political acumen of Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Following on suggestions by Defense Minister Magnus Malan that South Africa and the Soviet Union directly negotiate the emplacement of a "neutral" government in Angola, President Botha indicated that he doubted that Chester Crocker had contributed to a now perceived willingness on the part of Cuba to withdraw its forces short of a Namibian settlement. "It certainly took a

long time [to get to this point] and there was not real movement until we got involved directly." It was South African military might that mattered. Because of

Soviet confrontation-by-proxy in Angola. South Africa might be less obstructive if confronted with the fact of concerted superpower pressure. Indeed, its policies seem calculated to play the two superpowers off against each other, reflecting considerable apprehension about the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. Through the exercise of strong presidential leadership, the United States might be able to persuade both its allies and competitors to make it firmly but quietly clear to South Africa that failure to cooperate in regional peace initiatives would result in increasing economic, technological, and diplomatic isolation and ever more costly military expenditures.

Third, in collaboration with western allies and in dialogue with the Soviet Union, a new American administration might seek to encourage the MPLA government to extend its pragmatic economic reforms to the political realm. The MPLA might be encouraged to open its political system to regional, religious, and ethnic groups previously maltreated or marginalized. Were the MPLA to offer political amnesty, a degree of regional autonomy, full religious and cultural tolerance, and/or proposals for local cease fires and free elections, it might itself reduce, if not eliminate, the grievances that have nourished UNITA insurgency.

Finally, external powers, including the United States, might attempt to move the political focus away from the acceptability or unacceptability of Jonas Savimbi and press instead for a generous redefinition of the policy of National Reconciliation under which the MPLA has previously reconciled with former

Within the framework of a broadly accommodating opening of the Angolan political system it should be possible for Cuban forces to withdraw without loss of face, for an international peacekeeping force to move into areas bordering Namibia (South Africa would be unlikely to tangle with it), and for the United States to recognize the Angolan government and help it to reopen the Benguela railroad, thereby freeing Zaire and Zambia from their dependence on South African trade routes.

The United States allowed itself to be trapped into a self-defeating Angolan policy. It will need fully to exploit its capacity for strategic thinking, imaginative diplomacy, and multilateral leadership if it is to break out of this trap. Only then might it contribute to a peaceful solution to the Angolan tragedy. Success might, in fact, be beyond American reach at this stage - realism suggests modest expectations.

Nonetheless, buried under the hatred and violence that fuels the Angolan war lie the bricks of human decency with which to construct a different future. A new American administration must press all concerned to help Angola build a new, more open and prosperous society while simultaneously working to create and present to South Africa a new reality, that of collective political purpose. The Angolan war presents the United States with a defiant challenge. It also presents it with potentially exciting opportunity.

United States Policy Toward Mozambique

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A desperate situation exists in Mozambique.

- ! The countryside is gripped by war. The war has affected all 10 of Mozambique's provinces. Movement outside of major cities is restricted. Two million Mozambicans have been displaced by the war.
- ! The economy is in a state of virtual collapse. Per capita GNP has fallen to \$140 a year. Export earnings have plummeted.
- ! Human suffering has reached nearly unimaginable proportions. Reliable estimates indicate that 4.5 million people have been hurt by the war. In 1983-84 as many as 100,000 people died of starvation.
- ! The country's survival is now dependent on a massive international support effort. Over 30 non-governmental organizations now operate in Mozambique. Extensive economic and security assistance is provided by an ideologically diverse array of supporters.

The sources of Mozambique's troubles are many.

- ! Decades of Portuguese rule left a highly dependent, narrowly based, and extremely underdeveloped economy. At independence there were less than a handful of college educated Africans. Basic human services such as hospitals and schools were largely nonexistent in much of the country. Over 90% of the country was illiterate.
- ! A sudden and bitter transfer of power in 1975 resulting in the abrupt departure of over two hundred thousand Portuguese settlers left the new government headed by President Samora Machel largely unequipped to manage the economy and society.
- ! A commitment to Marxism-Leninism caused the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the ruling party, to launch an ill-advised attempt to socialize the economy that contributed to economic decline and alienated many peasants. For example, although they received the bulk of the agricultural budget, by 1982 state farms accounted for only 20% of total output and not a single state farm was profitable. Between 1979 and 1981 production on collective fields declined by 50%. By 1982, the state run industrial sector was operating at only 40% of capacity.
- ! FRELIMO's support for insurgents of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU) in the independence struggle in neighboring Rhodesia caused the Rhodesian government to launch direct military operations against Mozambique and sponsor the creation of the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), a band of anti-FRELIMO insurgents. South Africa took over RENAMO when Zimbabwe became independent. RENAMO now has roughly 12,000 troops and operates throughout the country. RENAMO is composed of a disparate collection of disaffected Mozambicans and forced recruits. There is a core group of insurgents led by Afonso Dhlakama, but they are probably not responsible for all of the activity attributed to RENAMO. Some military actions

- have been carried out directly by South African forces, others are the result of free banditry.
- ! Following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the South African government launched a concerted effort to destabilize Mozambique economically and militarily. This has involved supporting RENAMO, launching direct raids on alleged ANC facilities, cutting rail traffic through Maputo, and reducing the flow of Mozambican workers to the South African mines. But Pretoria has combined pressure with efforts to draw Maputo into its economic sphere. For example, South Africans still play a major role in running Maputo's port and are currently engaged in supporting the port's expansion.
 - ! In the early 1980s the country's plight was exacerbated by natural disaster, especially drought.

Mozambique's policies have changed significantly since 1975.

- ! Acknowledging the failures of its socialist economic policies, FRELIMO is now pursuing a balanced strategy that emphasizes market incentives and encourages foreign investment.
- ! Reliance on Soviet and Eastern bloc assistance has been greatly reduced.
- ! Extensive efforts have been made to establish close economic and political ties with the West.
- ! A pragmatic, accommodative posture toward South Africa has been adopted. Support for ANC military activity has stopped.

U.S. relations with Mozambique have improved considerably.

- ! In the latter years of the Carter era, Maputo and Washington began to develop a closer relationship, largely as a result of their mutual interest in a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia.
- ! After a brief but intense period of tension in 1981-82, the Reagan administration responded positively and aggressively to signals that Mozambique was interested in a rapprochement.
- ! This rapprochement was solidified in 1984 when Mozambique, with American encouragement, signed the Nkomati accord with South Africa.
- ! Despite the failure of the Nkomati accord to end South African support for RENAMO and the limited and highly restricted U.S. aid it has received, Mozambique remains committed to close ties with the United States and the West. In fact, it has no real alternative given Soviet reluctance to significantly increase assistance levels.
- ! Despite pressure from conservatives, the Reagan administration is unlikely to abandon its policy of supporting FRELIMO. With the other strands of its strategy of constructive engagement in tatters, it can ill afford to abandon its only southern African "success."

A new American administration will face a set of very difficult choices in Mozambique.

- ! The effectiveness of the Reagan administration's current policy is seriously hampered by: (1) indications of some support within the administration for a policy that would pressure FRELIMO to negotiate with RENAMO; and (2) congressional restrictions on aid to Mozambique.
- ! Support for Mozambique that does not address the security situation is unlikely to be very effective.

A new administration will have four options.

1. Continue the current policy of providing political and economic support without security assistance.
2. Provide security assistance either (a) bilaterally or (b) as part of a concerted international initiative.
3. Limit United States assistance to humanitarian aid and politically distance the United States from the situation.
4. Shift United States support to RENAMO.

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Footnotes

Note 1: *The Economist*, March 12, 1988. [Back.](#)

Note 2: See "Logistics Key to Relief in Angola," *Africa Recovery* (United Nations, New York), December 1987. [Back.](#)

Note 3: *New York Times*, March 28, 1988. [Back.](#)

Note 4: See, for example, the analyses in *The Economist*, March 19, 1988; *L'Express* (Paris), March 28, 1988; and *Christian Science Monitor*, November 3, 1987. [Back.](#)

Note 5: *Sunday Telegraph* (London), November 15, 1987. [Back.](#)

Note 6: Peter Youngusband in *The Washington Times*, March 17, 1988. [Back.](#)

Note 7: Arnaud de Borchgrave's interview with P.W. Botha, *Washington Times*, March 14, 1988. [Back.](#)

Note 8: Ibid. [Back.](#)

Note 9: Youngusband, *Washington Times*, March 17, 1988. [Back.](#)

Note 10: President dos Santos' statement to the Portuguese parliament, September 28, 1987. [Back.](#)

Note 11: See Colin Legum, "Southern Africa: Growing Interest in an International Conference to Discuss the Region's Problems," *Third World Reports* (London), February 10, 1988. [Back.](#)